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The purpose of this MBA Project is to illustrate how adding an element of 
Performance Based Pay to the U. S. Marine Corps’ compensation system would improve 
the Corps’ overall productivity by rewarding individual performance and adding 
incentives for Marines who might not be working to their full potential.  The goal of this 
project is to demonstrate how pay-for-performance schemes used in historical and current 
applications from both the private and public sectors can be successfully applied in the 
Marine Corps.  This project provides a documented background on performance based 
pays, a computer model showing one recommended method, and an introduction to the 
methodology, challenges and risks associated with the necessary cultural change.  
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 Some may feel that this work is disloyal in some way to our beloved Corps.  It is, 
in fact, an act of love and loyalty to an institution that is ingrained in both of us.  
Frequently the right decisions are the hardest to make – performance based pay would be 
a tough transition to initiate and maintain, but it would bring about new levels of 
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whom most of the credit on this work is due) and our esteemed advisors on this paper.  It 
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good that results of this work is to the credit of Owen and those who supported us in this 
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indeed a foundation of esprit de corps and work ethic imbued in me by the Corps that has 
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and analysis far greater than anything I could have ever done alone.  Most importantly, it 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Marine Corps is a well-respected organization with a noteworthy history 
of combat successes.  From its early focus on amphibious or expeditionary operations to 
its distinguishable task-force organization, it is an organization that has adapted its very 
purpose over 230 years in order to make it as combat ready and effective as possible.  
Like many successful organizations, the Marine Corps relies on its members to self-
enforce high standards and to seek methods for improvement.  The following project 
embodies this tenet in recommending the adoption of some element of performance based 
pay in to the Marine Corps’ total compensation package. 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Military compensation has been similar in structure since the formation of the 
colonial army.  In fact, today’s pay scales were designed before WWII, a time when the 
force was comprised largely of unskilled workers.1  The following discussion and 
analysis focuses on today’s compensation in the U.S. Marine Corps.  Marines’ primary 
motivation is not derived from the type or amount of pay they receive; they are motivated 
by their own discipline and a willingness to serve the public good.  Yet, while the 
compensation methods in use may not be the single most important driver of Marines’ 
service, pay is an influential factor that contributes to the Marine Corps strength as a 
whole.  This fundamental concept is captured in the introduction of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) sixth edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers: 
Compensation should be designed to foster and maintain the concept of 
the profession of arms as a dignified, respected, sought after, and 
honorable career. The emotional and spiritual satisfactions gained from the 
dedicated performance of uniformed service should be coupled with 
compensation sufficient for an individual member to maintain a standard 
of living commensurate with the carrying out of responsibilities that 
directly affect the security of the nation.2
 
1Frampton, 33, June 2000. 
2 Military Compensation Background Papers, 2, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Military_Comp.pdf], last accessed October 2005. 
  2
                                                
In the Marine Corps, as well as the rest of the DoD, there are numerous special 
and incentive (S&I) pays that compensate Marines on the basis of location, retention, and 
skills.  This is the historical precedent for special pays. Yet no Marine is paid directly for 
his or her effectiveness associated with their actual performance.  Part of the intent 
behind promotions in the military meritocracy is to reward superior performers through 
recognition, increased responsibility, and indirectly through increased pay that is linked 
to promotions.  Unfortunately, there is often a significant lag in time between a Marine’s 
performance and the occasions when he or she is eligible for promotion (where upon she 
receives the pay commensurate with services rendered).  Additionally, for a variety of 
reasons, a Marine worthy of special recognition or compensation may not remain in 
service long enough to be screened for his or her next promotion.  In the end, Marines 
who should be recognized with a fiscal reward for superior performance often don’t 
receive it at all or receive it too late to be associated with their efforts. 
The authors of the sixth edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers 
also recognize the “motivational aspect” of military pay.  To inspire service members to 
do their best, the Background Papers identify the requirement to establish a relationship 
between compensation and effort for each member.  They assert: 
The basic system, as well as any special pay or supplemental aspects, 
should be designed to encourage meritorious performance and 
advancement to higher responsibilities.3
In 1999, Congress stated that military pay should not only be adjusted for 
inflation and cost of living expenses similar to civilian pay, but it should also reflect 
trends in civilian pay.4  Today, more private and publicly held institutions are turning to 
performance based pay at all levels of the organization to increase productivity, retention, 
and morale.5  Despite the government’s rhetoric, though, none of the S&I pays are 
specifically related to performance.  The U. S. government, in its introduction to the 
 
3 Military Compensation Background Papers, 9, May 2005, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Military_Comp.pdf], last accessed October 2005.  
4 Frampton, 3, June 2000. 
5 Allen and Helms, 74, 2001. 
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methods of military pay, states that pay must “be designed to encourage meritorious 
performance,”6 yet no pay in the Marine Corps is focused on accomplishing this.  
Instead, the basis for all S&I compensations are reactive augments used by manpower 
management to encourage either recruitment or retention.7
This project builds upon Marine Captain Scott Frampton’s efforts in his 2000 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis on performance based pay for the U.S. military.  
Captain Frampton’s thesis cites the USMC as an ideal candidate to lead the DoD in 
taking on such an endeavor; this project adds two crucial elements to Frampton’s 
foundation.  First, it includes a method and an optimization model for a performance 
based bonus that uses criteria from a survey of Marines on pay to gauge how 
performance pay might influence Marines.  Second, after demonstrating the value added 
of a performance based bonus, this paper begins laying the groundwork for implementing 
an organizational change of this magnitude in the Marine Corps. 
 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this paper is to show that including a component of performance 
based pay in the Marine Corps’ compensation structure represents a realistic means to 
enhance the Corps’ effectiveness and efficiency.  Leveraging Frampton’s thorough 
foundation, this project will demonstrate the viability of incorporating performance based 
pay on both a fiscal as well as cultural level. 
Many will argue that incentivizing Marines with extra pay will diminish good 
order and discipline; that the prospect of pay-related competition amongst peers will 
create animosity that overpowers patriotism, unit cohesion, and esprit de corps.  Yet there 
is an element of competition that already exists for promotion; awards–performance pay 
would fall into this same category.  Others might assess that Marines do not serve for 
pay, and a financial complement for performance would be unnecessary or even 
                                                 
6 Military Compensation Background Papers, 23, May 2005, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Military_Comp.pdf], last accessed October 2005. 
7 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, 77, 2001, 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/qrmc/v1/index.htm], last accessed November 2005. 
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demeaning – performance based pay in the Corps should be viewed figuratively more as 
a pat on the back than as carrot in terms of motivational tools. 
The current trend in the private and public sector is to pay, at least partially, on 
the basis of merit.8  Respected businessmen/women in the private sector do not regard 
this as demeaning or unnecessary; they simply see it as appropriate and fair.  The 
National Security Personnel System, the DoD’s attempt at incorporating pay-for-
performance for civilian employees, is in the middle of a drawn-out implementation.  The 
opposition is based less on what is appropriate pay, and more on fear of change and a 
perceived threat to individuals’ financial security.9  Furthermore, the other components of 
the armed forces are beginning to consider the benefits of adding a component of 
performance based pay to their systems.  Ultimately the Marine Corps does not need 
performance pay; it is a self-motivated organization with higher initiators than money.  
Rather, it is reasonable to expect many Marines would increase their already higher than 
average performance if they knew they would be receive pay more commensurate with 
their efforts. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
This paper’s research questions are: 
1. How can the Marine Corps include an element of Merit-Based Pay 
in its pay system? 
2. How might the Corps effectively implement and sustain this 
financial and cultural shift? 
 
D. SCOPE LIMITATIONS  
This study, though largely applicable to the entire DoD, is limited to USMC 
compensation policies.  The other military branches within the DoD, as well as other 
DoD agencies, may be exploring the idea of implementing some elements of performance 
 
8 Summers, 18, 2005. 
9 Barr, “Legal Wrangling, Implementation Woes Slow Rollout of New Pay,” 13 September 2005. 
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based pay into their pay schemes,10 but there are no indications that the Marine Corps is 
considering this technique.  Although there are clearly implications that are applicable to 
the other services, for purposes of simplicity and focus, this paper will address pay-for-
performance as it would apply to Marine E-5s (Sergeants) and above: their performance, 
morale, esprit de corps, unit integrity, retention, and culture.  This narrow scope enables a 
more concise discussion on the topic and has a single point of performance measurement 
that is accepted and universal–the Marine Corps Fitness Report.  
An additional limitation of this analysis is absence of opinions from a cross-
section of the Marines on whom this topic focuses.  The survey conducted in research for 
this project was limited to less than 200 Marines, all officers.   
This paper will not provide the end-state necessary to implement a performance 
based pay program; it has a starting point for establishing a utility-based distribution (the 
model) and some suggestions on initiating change. 
 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
Primary research tools for this project included compensation textbooks, reviews 
of current periodicals and journals, governmental and research institute publications, and 
a survey of two hundred Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Marines.  Secondary sources 
included interviews with pay/compensation experts, Internet sources, and textbooks.  The 
methodology included: 
• Literature review 
• Interviews with NPS faculty Pay & Compensation subject matter experts 
• Creation of a demonstration optimization model 
• Approval and execution of survey of NPS Marine officers 




10 Hamilton, 1, 2005. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
Following the introduction, the second chapter discusses the authors’ meaning 
and intentions for performance pay in the Marine Corps. Chapters three and four include 
a recommendation for design and implementation.  The final chapter of the project covers 
potential consequences and additional factors for consideration. 
The structure is organized in the following manner: 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
CHAPTER II:  CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE BASED PAY  
The principles behind military compensation and pay-for-performance 
compensation schemes are detailed in this chapter.  Background discussions on behavior 
theory, performance measurement, types of pay-for-performance schemes, and the new 
NSPS compensation system being implemented by the DoD are included.  The final topic 
of the chapter is how these principles relate to the USMC as an organization capable of 
improving its own pay system, specifically the critical linkage to the USMC Personnel 
Evaluation System as a performance measurement tool.  The results of the NPS survey 
are also discussed in this section. 
CHAPTER III: RECOMMENDATION  
This chapter discusses in depth the types of pay-for-performance systems that the 
Marine Corps may consider.  Sections on requisite characteristics of possible schemes 
and the rationale behind eliminating those considered impractical for the Marine Corps 
are included.  A detailed discussion follows on a performance based bonus, regarded as 
the best alternative.  The ability to execute this selected example is demonstrated using a 
computer model that associates performance bonuses with utility and distribution. 
CHAPTER IV:  IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
This section outlines the difficulties that will be encountered and some of the 
techniques that may be used to implement organizational change.  The Marine Corps is 
an organization deeply imbued with tradition.  Marines in leadership positions have risen 
to that point in a system that favors them, and many are averse to change for fear that 
  7
they may no longer be compatible with the organization.  It is imperative that any 
intended change (that affects such a large population) be well communicated, 
collaborated, implemented, and supervised. 
There are numerous consequences to a Corps-wide systemic change.  Though 
most will be beneficial, this section also addresses recognized challenges and discusses 
some of the potential unintended outcomes.  Many negative side effects can be thwarted 
through careful planning, communication, and execution of the change.  Others will need 
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis as they arise.   









































II. PERFORMANCE BASED PAY IN PRACTICE 
Extensive literature analyzes the various details associated with formulating 
compensation strategy.  Entire textbooks are dedicated to this fundamental human 
resource topic, as are journals such as Compensation and Benefits Review and the Journal 
of Compensation and Benefits.  This topic is extremely broad and bears enormous 
influence upon an organization’s goals, values, and performance, as well as upon the 
individual employee/professional and his or her personal interests.  Consensus suggests 
three basic employee attributes that are typically considered in compensation design:  
experience, longevity, and performance.  Government/military compensation traditionally 
focuses on the first two, though the latter has certainly gained momentum in recent 
history.  The following discussion is not intended to serve as a stand-alone baseline for 
this complex topic.  Rather, this project considers the details addressed here most 
essential to the specific topics of military member compensation and, subsequently, to 
performance based compensation.  
 
A. MILITARY COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES 
Military compensation is a frequent topic of debate both inside and outside of the 
DoD.  Examples of such organizations include the U.S. Congress, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), the DoD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), the RAND Institute, and the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA).  While detailed consensus on policy may be unachievable amongst so many 
organizations, the fundamental purposes for compensation systems are largely consistent.  
The CNA depicts such purpose, one that could easily represent those of any branch of the 
armed forces, in its 2000 Compensation Strategy for the Future Force.  Figure 1 
identifies four responsibilities of the U.S. Navy’s compensation system: attract and retain 
workers; motivate effective work; allocate workers among jobs; and maintain 
organization-specific goals.  Furthermore, these goals are to be achieved at the lowest 
possible cost.  
 
  
Figure 1.   Center for Naval Analyses Military Compensation Model11  
 
This military-specific compensation strategy differs little from civilian strategies.  
Authors George T. Milkovich and Jerry M. Newman describe total compensation 
formulation strategy in their textbook Compensation.  Figure 2 illustrates their four basic 
steps:  Assess Total Compensation Implications; Fit Policy Decisions to Strategy; 
Implement Strategy; and Reassess the Fit.  The authors further assert, “The steps are 
simple, executing them is complex.”12  Indeed, the detailed considerations under each of 
their four steps are commonplace in strategic planning; the difficulty lies not in the 





                                                 
11 Koopman, Clyke, Golding, Hansen, and Husted, 4, September 2000. 
12 Milkovich and Newman, 36, 2005. 
  
Figure 2.   General Compensation Model13 
 
Even more significant than the multitude of beliefs behind compensation, as 
Milkovich & Newman’s model portrays, is the requirement that the system continually be 
evaluated and refined for better efficiency and effectiveness.  For numerous reasons, the 
DoD typically lags the civilian sector in its ability to continually monitor and re-evaluate 
its compensation system.  In fact, most of the main components of the current military 
pay system have changed very little since the post-World-War II era.14     
Every four years, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & 
Readiness authors a Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), an analysis 
that includes a thorough comparison of military and civilian compensation systems.  The 
topic of pay-for-performance is addressed quite heavily in the 8th QRMC from 1996.  In 
the following 9th QRMC of 2000, however, the topic is given little consideration.  
Summarized in Table 1 are the basic differences in rationale between institutional- and  
 
 11
                                                 
13 Milkovich and Newman, 36, 2005. 
14 9th QRMC, 19, 2001. 
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market-based compensation systems.  The bottom line is that the DoD maintains a 
paternalistic approach to paying its service members.  CNA analysts cite this reality in 
their report:  
Other widely discussed problems [in military compensation] include the 
relatively small amount of discretionary pay available to support goals 
from attracting and retaining people in occupations with high civilian pay, 
to rewarding performance, to filling hard-to-fill billets.15
 
Category Institutional Approach Market Approach
Philosophy Equal Pay for Equal Responsibility Equal Pay for Equal Work 
Pay Purposes Enhanced Relationship betweenIndividual and Organization 
Obtain Best Force at 
Lowest Possible Cost 
Framework Intangibles such as Cohesion, Honor, and Commitment Labor Supply and Demand 
Pay Paternalistic; Deferred Income and In-kind Payments 
Individualistic; Current Income
and Personal Preference 
Allowances Based Upon Service Members’ Need 
Based upon Equality of Pay 
and Work 
Employment Basis Members’ Role is to Defend The Nation Members’ Role is Skill-based 
Pay Adjustments Uniformly Applied to all Service Members 
Applied Only to Critical 
Occupations 
Table 1.   
                                                
Summary and Comparison of Institutional and Market Approaches to Military 
Compensation16 
 
A final vantage from which to view military compensation is one consistent with 
overall basic government responsibility—its effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability.  
Current military pay practices rightfully sacrifice efficiency for effectiveness as it is a 
matter of national security.  As military pay is influenced by powerful organizations from 
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government, it is a constant tool for 
political jockeying and positioning.  Furthermore, the U.S. military budget is 
approximately equal to of the rest of worlds’ military budgets combined; and twenty-five 
 
15 Koopman, Clyke, Golding, Hansen, and Husted, 13, September 2000. 
16 Frampton, 100, June 2000. 
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percent of that goes toward military personnel.  It is reasonable to conclude that the DoD 
has at its disposal the resources to pay its service members effectively, or enough to field 
a force of any size approved by Congress.  The inherent trade-off in this system is 
inefficiency.  At over two million personnel across the various military branches, by 
using a common pay scale based only on rank and years of service, that the DoD 
knowingly favors a simple and consistent scheme. 
To some extent, the same arguments are appropriate for equitability.  Members of 
the armed forces are inspired to join the military for a variety of reasons beyond the scope 
of this analysis.  However, given the fact that there are over seventy types of military 
special, incentive, and bonus pays to augment basic pay and allowances for housing and 
subsistence, many of these pays eventually go to service members who fully intend to 
perform their mission regardless of the added job-based incentives.   
Lastly, military pay does little to explicitly inspire service members to perform 
their job any better than the minimum required.  Although most Marines pride themselves 
in their self-discipline, the motivation to perform above and beyond the call of duty lies 
on an individual or unit’s patriotism, esprit de corps, promotion or award prospects, or 
fear of retribution by those accountable for the units’ success. Like most other 
organizations that pay employees based on longevity and experience alone, the military 
has its “deadwood,” or those members who get paid for just showing up to work.  The 
1999 CNA analysis also cited in their report: 
With its complex and inflexible array of pays, it should not be surprising 
that the military compensation system sometimes results in incentives that 
have nothing to do with, or even interfere with, strategic goals.17
 
17 Koopman, Clyke, Golding, Hansen, and Husted, 20, September 2000. 
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B. PERFORMANCE BASED PAY 
If employees can make a clear link between their work and their rewards, 
they’ll do better work.18
Robert Heneman, OSU Associate Professor of Management and 
Human Resources 
The concept of performance based pay is by no means new, and it is certainly not 
without its share of critics.  While it has increased in popularity over the past twenty 
years under the aliases “Pay-for-performance,” “Variable pay,” or “At-risk 
compensation,” it originated under the auspices of commission based, or “piecework” 
compensation.19  Until the turn of the twenty-first century, however, its only notable 
success was its application toward executives’ stock options and gain-sharing plans.  
However, despite the details of the system, the aim is consistent: link employee and/or 
organizational performance to employee compensation.   
The old adage “You get what you pay for” comes to mind in considering what 
motivates people to perform.  Yet the concept that more pay yields greater performance is 
complicated by individual needs and values.  For example, there surely exists some point 
where too much pay produces a point of diminishing returns in performance.  Milkovich 
and Newman ask: “Why not admit it?  We don’t know what makes people tick!”20   
A controversial topic in the past, “research evidence shows that merit pay 
systems, in general, have a significant positive impact on employee performance and on 
organizational productivity.”21  Allen and Helms in 2001 concluded:  
An analysis of variance indicated that overall, the reward practices were 
significant predictors of performance (F=4.269, p<.0001), and the reward 
practices explained nearly 41% of variance in organizational performance 
(r2=.409).22  
 
18 Budman, 34, June 1997. 
19 Ganzel, 36, December 1998. 
20 Milkovich & Newman, 283, 2005. 
21 Terpestra and Honoree, “Employees’ Responses to Merit Pay Inequity,” 51, January/February 2005.  
22 Allen and Helms, 77, July/August 2001. 
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Bloom and Milkovich add: 
The pay-for-performance relationship of 501 managers in 72 companies 
and found that salary, bonus, and total compensation were positively 
related to total shareholder return and growth in firm sales.23
Finally, in their 2005 text, Milkovich and Newman summarize the substantial evidence in 
support of pay-for-performance effectiveness: 
In a more comprehensive review, Heneman reports that 40 of 42 studies 
looking at merit pay claim performance increases when pay is tied to 
performance.  One study of 841 union and nonunion companies found 
gain-sharing and profit-sharing plans (both designed to link pay to 
performance) increased individual and team performance 18 to 20 percent. 
…  Organizations with such plans had 3.5 to 5 percent higher annual 
performance.24
This of course does not suggest that pay-for-performance systems are the right 
answer for every organization.  The 2001-2002 World at Work Total Salary Increase 
Budget Survey indicated that nearly two-thirds of companies offer some form of variable 
pay (with twenty-two percent of those without variable pay, planning its implementation 
within the next year).25  Yet organizations that are ideal candidates for such systems 
struggle to design and implement schemes appropriate for their circumstances.  
Sometimes, the unfortunate result is disillusionment with a dysfunctional system, 
perceptions of inequity, and diminished performance and morale.26   
More detailed discussion of these systems follows on topics of behavior science, 






23 Bloom and Milkovich, 284, June 1998. 
24 Milkovich and Newman, 271, 2000. 
25 Lyons and Ben-Ora, 34, March/April 2002. 
26 Terpestra and Honoree, “The Relative Importance of External, Internal, Individual and Procedural 
Equity to Pay Satisfaction,” 71, November/December 2003. 
  16
                                                
1. Behavior Science and Performance Based Pay 
The following behavior theories are discussed to develop a foundation for pay-
for-performance applications in the U.S. military, particularly the Marine Corps.  Specific 
military applications are described where appropriate. 
 
a. Equity Theory and Employee Attraction/Retention 
Pay system characteristics directly influence employees’ decisions to join 
organizations.27  Wage rate or salary is, of course, one of the first deliberations one 
seeking employment considers.  Furthermore, research suggests that candidates seek out 
potential employers based on the closeness of fit between their personalities and the 
organization’s reward systems.28  It is not surprising that risk-averse people will avoid 
organizations that use pay-for-performance based systems.  The opposite holds true for 
risk-taking personalities.  Organizations benefit themselves by considering the 
personalities of their target employees when strategizing, designing, and reassessing the 
fit of their compensation system. 
Perhaps more significant is the effect on employee retention as it relates to 
organizations’ pay systems.  It intuitively makes sense that dissatisfaction with pay can 
be a key factor in employee turnover—particularly if it represents a fundamental 
mismatch in individual versus organizational values.  Research suggests that how pay is 
determined has an impact in this regard as well.29  Individuals consciously or 
subconsciously consider four factors of equity when determining if their pay is “fair”: 
external, internal, individual, and procedural equity.30  External equity compares their 
organization’s compensation system to other organizations’, while internal equity 
considers how pay compares to other sections within the organization.  Employees 
consider individual based equity relative to individual performance contributions.   
 
27 Milkovich and Newman, 272, 2005. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Terpestra and Honoree, “The Relative Importance of External, Internal, Individual and Procedural 
Equity to Pay Satisfaction,” 67, November/December 2003. 
30 Ibid, 68. 
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However, it is procedural equity, the relative fairness of allocation of pay 
within the organization, which turns out to be the most important of the four.  Terpestra 
and Honoree assert, “Procedural equity was perceived to be the most important form of 
fairness that contributed to overall pay satisfaction.”31  As an example, some Marines 
may earn more total compensation than others by nature of their specialty’s difficulty, 
level of perceived or statistical risk, or training requirements (i.e., aviators or linguists), 
but a definite problem of procedural equity would arise should two Marines of the same 
grade, rank, and qualification knowingly earn different amounts of pay.   
This discussion of equity theory is most useful for strategic analysis of an 
organization’s compensation, but it is no panacea.  It certainly does not suggest that 
successful organizations never allow pay inconsistencies to occur.  At over 170,000 
personnel end-strength, the Marine Corps is simply too large to realistically expect 
absolute equity across all ranks and specialties.  Nonetheless, the Corps’ leadership 
should be cognizant of the effects this outlook may have on Marine buy-in and trust:  
“Organizational researchers have found that when a process is considered fair, even if the 
outcome is unfavorable, employees will tend to be positive about the organization.”32   
 
b. Agency Theory 
Principal-agent issues are pervasive concerns in compensation systems.  
The principal, usually the employer, has a direct interest in motivating the agents, his 
employees, to work for the betterment of the organization.  As the required jobs range in 
differing levels of excitement and difficulty, the task of effectively, efficiently, and 
equitably compensating these employees as a group and as individuals is truly daunting.  
While the very basis for pay-for-performance systems aims to better align what the 
organization’s leadership considers valuable with what the employees will work to 
achieve, these systems nonetheless experience difficulties in achieving the desired results.  
Bloom and Milkovich describe: 
 
31 Terpestra and Honoree, “The Relative Importance of External, Internal, Individual and Procedural 
Equity to Pay Satisfaction,” 70, November/December 2003.  
32 Cole and Flint, 58, March/April 2005. 
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For principals, there are costs- including performance trade-offs- for using 
incentive pay, since it may cause agents to reduce effort or demand higher 
pay levels or may induce them to engage in practices designed to reduce 
the variability of their pay that are coincidentally detrimental to 
organizational outcomes.33
From the standpoint of agency theory, where people tend to avoid both 
risk and work, pay-for-performance plans again better align individual and organizational 
goals.  This is particularly true in job settings where monitoring employees is difficult. 
The presumption in this case is that employees will demand a higher total pay in order to 
compensate for the higher risk they assume in being paid on a basis of their performance.  
Also, the system must have very clear and direct desired performance attributes and the 
ability to measure performance in as objective a system possible.  Both of these attributes 
appear to have some relevance to the Marine Corps.  Compared to private sector 
employees, Marines, as “agents,” are likely to be less motivated to seek greater monetary 
compensation from the Corps should some of their pay become performance based due to 
the intrinsic value of national service.  However, this is an unsubstantiated claim.  The 
latter point on requiring an objective performance measurement system is discussed at 
length in the following section. 
 
c. Expectancy Theory 
Victor Vroom’s expectancy theory is based on the idea that individual 
effort and behavior is based on an individual’s perceived outcomes.34  As the affects of 
emotions are not measurable in this theory, it is one of the most difficult theories to test.  
Still, pay-for-performance systems in theory should have their greatest influence through 
this vantage.   
Under the principles of expectancy theory, motivation is derived through 
expectancy, instrumentality, and valence, or anticipated satisfaction from the outcome.  
In a pay-for-performance system, the valence for employees is changed to reflect the 
 
33 Bloom and Milkovich, 284, June 1998. 
34 McShane and Von Glinow, 147, 2003. 
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potential changes in earnings due to good or bad performance.  In turn, employee 
motivation and behavior must follow suit in order to achieve the valence. 
For the military, analysis of expectancy theory gained particular attention 
in the 7th and 8th QRMCs.  The authors of the 7th QRMC from 1992 recommended a 
restructuring of the military pay tables to “increase the returns to promotion and decrease 
the returns to longevity.”35  The hope was that service-members would see this as a 
means of increasing rewards for performance. 
The authors of the 8th QRMC argued that “motivation can be enhanced by 
strengthening two expectancies thorough which rewards are associated with performance 
and by increasing the valence of rewards.”36  They concluded that the DoD could easily 
forge stronger links between employee desired outcomes and rewards by decreasing the 
time interval between reward events.  This would entail merit based promotions versus 
incorporating elements of performance based pay.  Such a change has been dubbed an 
improved “line of sight” between outcome and reward.  They also suggest that work 
structure could be better organized to allow individuals to perceive more clearly the 
outcomes from their efforts.  This point captures the essence of this project as it relates to 
behavior theory and is worthy of detailed discussion.   
For illustrative purposes, Figure 3 combines three models presented in the 
8th QRMC to depict a logical sequencing of their recommendations for changing military 
pay from the status quo.  The first shows the basic model for military compensation in 
which the extrinsic award, pay, is appropriately the result of individual behavior.  
Intrinsic awards from promotion and selection for competitive programs exist inside of 
the personnel management system, but are not linked directly to basic extrinsic awards.  
This separation of personnel management seems counterintuitive at first, but it represents 
a fundamental element of compensating military personnel—consistent, equitable pay for 
all members. 
 
35 8th QRMC, 103, 1997. 
36 Ibid, 101. 
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The second model graphically illustrates the over-burdened roles of 
promotion and retention selection boards in determining individual compensation.  Under 
the tenets of expectancy theory, an organization that relies so heavily on the results of 
individual promotion and/or retention must accept individuals seeking their expected 
valence purely on the strength of these events.  Should personnel management not 
effectively consider performance as a significant factor for determining 
promotion/retention eligibility, not just time-in-service and time-in-grade, the 
organization must acknowledge that it implicitly encourages members to value these two 
events above actual performance.  This is, in fact, a weakness of the both the military and 
Marine Corps and is discussed further in following sections. 
The third model in the sequence shows the potential effects of including 
“Performance Assessment” conducted by personnel management into the military 
compensation process.  This explicit inclusion of individual performance assessment 
alleviates the over-burdened promotion/retention events by creating a clear link between 
performance and pay. 
In summary, the current military compensation lacks an effective means of 
linking performance to the extrinsic reward of compensation.  The intrinsic awards too 
heavily influence the system and over-burden the promotion and retention selection 
process.  Without the proper reinforcement for strong performers, service members look 
inward to what elements of their system they can influence in order to achieve a higher 
valence.  In turn, those that succeed in the system are not necessarily the strongest 




                                                
Figure 3.   Behavior, Personnel Management, Compensation Relationship Models37  
 
37 8th QRMC, 13-15, 31, 1997. 
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d. Behavioral Science Conclusions 
Pay-for-performance systems are not without fault, nor are they right for 
every organization.  Regarding this concept, Ganzel points out: “It sounds great, it makes 
intuitive sense, and it’s supposed to be the last word in motivational tools.  Now if we 
could just figure out a way to keep it from blowing up in our faces.”38   
Equity, agency, and expectancy theories only scratch the surface in 
addressing the breadth of individual and organizational motivations, values, and cultures 
as they pertain to pay-for-performance.  One cannot imagine all the varieties of long-term 
effects that result from implementing poorly designed or antiquated schemes—the reality 
is that these systems are constantly in flux.  Milkovich and Newman profess: 
Maybe the problem is that merit pay systems are out of favor right now.  
One survey of 250 companies reports that 30 percent are thinking about 
eliminating merit pay and another 10 percent already have.  Despite this 
unrest, merit pay is still a pay-for-performance plan used for more than 
three-quarters of all exempt, clerical, and administrative employees.39
Distinct advantages exist for organizations willing and able to invest in 
pay-for-performance systems—as long as they have fully anticipated the consequences.  
But organizations must be wary that the opposite holds true as well.  Budman points out a 
common and unfortunate behavioral reality for many firms: 
There’s an entitlement culture that’s grown up in many organizations, and 
employees have become very accustomed to receiving merit increases, so 
not receiving them would be like attacking motherhood and the flag.40
Finally, the military acknowledges a general lack of “explicit intellectual 
foundation” in the design of its compensation schemes.  In comparing the military to 
private sectors counterparts, they state: 
What has not received comparable research attention and thought are the 
underlying concepts and principles that cause the structure of military 
compensation to cohere in a logical and self-reinforcing fashion. In short, 
 
38 Ganzel, 34, December 1998. 
39 Milkovich & Newman, 286, 2005. 
40 Budman, 34, June 1997. 
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the relationships between the individual components of compensation and 
their systemic interrelationships as a coherent structure remain largely 
implicit rather than explicit. Virtually every aspect of military activity has 
explicit doctrines, principles, and practices embodied in field manuals, 
technical manuals, and various joint publications. Military compensation 
is noteworthy in its lack of such an explicit intellectual foundation.41
Some of the potentially negative consequences as they relate to the U.S. 
Marine Corps will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
2. Measuring Performance 
Your managers hate it.  Your employers hate it.  By any measure, it does 
not do what it’s supposed to do.  In fact, no one’s quite sure what it’s 
supposed to do.  It’s the annual performance-review charade, in which, 
typically, managers and managed play an uncomfortable, closed-door 
game that no one wins. 42
Matthew Budman, Across the Board
Perhaps the most difficult element of merit-based pay systems is the critical 
element of employee performance measurement.  In order for a pay-for-performance 
system to have the intended result, an organizations’ leadership must be able to determine 
the attributes by which it will rate its workforce—this is no simple task.  Once standards 
have been decided upon, the ability to actually measure performance by them is an 
entirely different challenge.  Finally, measuring the utility of awarding one particular 
performance trait over another is extremely difficult—the results of which are typically 
not discovered until potentially negative unintended consequences have taken effect. 
Some organizations use performance measurement systems with no immediate 
linkages between employee evaluations and rewards.  Such systems are prevalent in 
government-based organizations where longevity and experience are the bedrock for 
assessing employee value.  Under these circumstances, supervisors have little incentive to 
                                                 
41 Military Compensation Background Papers, 2, May 2005, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Military_Comp.pdf], last accessed October 2005. 
42 Budman, 33, June 1997. 
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rate employees accurately,43 and the resulting consequences range from minimally 
positive to a significantly negative influence on the workers and unit.  This reality is the 
very basis for pay-for-performance systems.  Ganzel states: 
If you think of your paycheck as something you are entitled to just for 
showing up, you do your job on autopilot.  You give the company what 
you must, but no more.  But if part or all of your salary is contingent on 
how well you actually perform your job, you’ll go the extra mile.  You’ll 
attack work with vigor and revel in the rewards.  And if you and enough of 
your co-workers get this kind of incentive, you might even deliver the 
service that could turn a floundering company around.44
In the Marine Corps, most Marines perform their jobs for reasons of greater 
accord than pure monetary compensation.  Marines perform their duties out of discipline 
and patriotism, as well as loyalty to each other and their unit. Yet there is an element of 
truth in Ganzel’s assertion that has universal application.   
A particularly daunting task is evaluating employee performance in complex work 
environments.  These include cases where subordinates are not easily observable by 
managers or where workers perform a variety of different tasks.  Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy state: 
While some jobs, such as sales, lend themselves to objective 
measurement, performance in most jobs cannot be measured objectively 
because joint production and unobservability mean that individual output 
is not readily quantifiable.45
The less objective employees perceive their performance appraisal system, the 
less likely they will envision themselves being recognized and appropriately 
compensated.  Organizations reliant upon subjective performance evaluations systems 
require significant trust and social pressure as norms.46 In his 2000 thesis on Performance 
Based Pay for the U.S. Military, Frampton identifies three considerations to lessen the 
effects of subjectivity in choosing performance criteria.  First, individuals must be able to 
 
43 Budman,, 34, June 1997. 
44 Ganzel, 36, December 1998. 
45 Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 7, July 1988. 
46 Budman, 35, June 1997. 
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influence the performance metrics by which they are evaluated.  Second, the results must 
be verifiable.  Human judgment will inevitably be involved, but documentation (i.e., 
counseling) greatly reduces the potential for conflict.  Finally, the performance criteria 
must have a direct and positive effect on organization objectives.47
Managers do well to remember that jeopardizing employees’ pay is inherently a 
sensitive undertaking.  “It transforms the role of compensation from carrot to stick; it 
introduces anxiety and even desperation to the equation.”48  Furthermore, pay is a clumsy 
tool when used as motivator in terms of fear.  In general, pay-for-performance systems 
receive a disproportionate level of “bad press” at the hands of organizations that hastily 
implement schemes inappropriate for their needs. 
Performance measurement in the Marine Corps is as great a challenge as it is in 
the private sector.  Frampton describes the currently used military rewards systems of 
awards/accolades, promotions, and on the spot “back patting.”  Rather than retell his 
findings, the following analysis is intended to further develop the discussion on the 
promotion system, as it is the most the Marine Corps offers. 
The most direct relation between performance and compensation in the military is 
the promotion process.  However, this link is all but non-existent for most service 
members throughout their first fifteen or so years in the military because, as Frampton 
points out, promotion is based almost exclusively on time-in-service/time-in-grade.49  For 
example, in the Marine Corps officer ranks, promotion through Captain (O-3) is a 
function of time since commissioning.  It has almost nothing to do with performance; 
barring a gross conduct offense; currently, a Marine officer can expect to be selected for 
Captain approximately 4 to 5 years after commissioning.50
Promotion rates to retirement eligible ranks also reveal a lack of substantial 
relevance to performance.  Milkovich and Newman state: “There is clear evidence that 
 
47 Frampton, 129, June 2000. 
48 Budman, 36, 1998, June 1997. 
49 Frampton, 123, June 2000. 
50 FY 2006 USMC Captain Selection Board, 1, 2006, [https://www.manpower.usmc.mil], last 
accessed November 2005. 
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poor performers are more likely to leave an organization than are good performers.”51  
Yet it is difficult to grasp the correlation between good and bad performers staying or 
leaving the Marine Corps when 90% percent and 65% of eligible Marines up for 
promotion to the guaranteed retirement ranks of Major (O-4) and Staff Sergeant (E-6), 
respectively, are selected through annual promotion boards.52  More discouraging, 
research indicates that over time, “the average and poor performers are less mobile, and 
they will find it more difficult to find other work.”53  The U.S. military fills it ranks as 
necessary to perform missions of vital national interest, but one questions both the 
effectiveness of the promotion process as the primary tool by which to encourage strong 
performance along the way.   
The authors of the 8th QRMC conducted in-depth research concerning the 
military’s promotion process as an effective human resource management tool.  
Regarding the linkage of promotion to performance, they state: 
In the focus groups we conducted, military members were asked about 
their perceptions of the fairness of how rewards are distributed with 
respect to performance. In many groups, participants cited what they 
regarded as selection errors in promotion processes (selection of less-
deserving people or failure to select more deserving people).  When asked 
to quantify the extent of the errors, respondents typically estimated 
between 5 and 50 percent. In written surveys taken by focus group 
participants, we also received responses that indirectly confirm a 
perceived gap between performance and promotion outcomes. When 
asked whether performance should affect pay, 69 percent said yes. When 
asked if it does affect pay, 31 percent said yes.54
While their research is limited in sample size, the combination of 69% of 
respondents believing that performance should be linked to pay with up to a 50% error in 
the promotion selection process is striking evidence that this critical link is dysfunctional.   
 
51 Milkovich and Newman, 273, 2005. 
52 FY 2007 USMC Major Selection Board Precept, 2, and 2005 Staff Sergeant Selection Board, 1, 
2006, [https://www.manpower.usmc.mil], last accessed November 2005. 
53 Terpestra and Honoree, “Employees’ Responses to Merit Pay Inequity,” 51, January/ February 
2005. 
54 8th QRMC, 19, 1997. 
  27
                                                
31% percent of respondents believing that performance does affect pay further supports 
this thesis.  Lastly, regarding the concept of pay-for-performance, they find: 
Interestingly, the gap between performance and promotion was seen as 
reflecting the difficulty of measuring performance completely and 
accurately; most people did not want to have pay based directly on 
performance because they were skeptical that their performance could be 
measured objectively. In addition, some expressed concern that pay for 
performance would undermine intrinsic motivation—the foundation for a 
norm of excellence. Given these concerns, most were happy to reward 
performance indirectly through promotion, even though people judged 
promotion to be imperfectly correlated with performance. They seemed to 
have some faith that the promotion system tended, in the long run, to 
screen out poor performers and reward good performers.55
Service members acknowledge the difficulty in fairly evaluating performance.  
They intuitively grasp that the poor correlation between performance and promotion 
could translate into a similarly poor correlation between performance and performance 
based pay.  This opinion reflects a basic lack of trust in the performance evaluation 
system in place, and therefore any sort of reward system designed around ratings it 
produces.  Additionally, some respondents indicate that patriotism and esprit de corps 
would be undermined by the presence of a more extrinsic linkage between pay and 
performance.  These last two topics will be further developed in Chapter IV.   
The final item brought out by the respondents runs counter to research in the 
private sector.  The notion that poor performers can “fool the system” in the short-term 
but are eventually weeded out is popular in the Marine Corps.  However, in the long-
term, higher-level performers (or those that perceive themselves to be) will likely become 
dissatisfied with the procedural inequity of a longevity based compensation system and 
be the first to seek employment elsewhere.  
Finally, promotions in the military occur too infrequently to have a pronounced 
effect on short-term individual performance.  For members who intend to leave the 
service after their initial obligation or soon thereafter, prospects for promotion have little 
to no influence at all.   
 
55 8th QRMC, 19, 1997. 
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3. Pay-For-Performance Systems in Action 
As mentioned previously, no two pay-for-performance systems are, nor should 
necessarily be, exactly the same.  The following descriptions outline some of the basic 
characteristics of popular pay-for-performance systems in use today.  This list is certainly 
not all encompassing and is intended to lay an unbiased foundation for follow-on 
recommendations. 
 
a. Individual Incentive Plans 
Some organizations find that individual incentive plans yield the best 
results.  Such systems include merit pay, lump sum bonuses, spot awards, or some 
combination of the three.  Merit pay is increasingly under attack for its tendency to 
fluctuate wages/salaries from period to period as well as a general misperception towards 
its effectiveness in improving performance.  To be discussed later in this chapter, merit 
pay is currently being implemented in the civilian sector of the DoD. 
Lump sum bonuses are fairly common in corporate America.  
Additionally, the federal government has relied upon end-of-year bonuses for civil 
servants for years.  Currently, 26% of private sector organizations report using lump sum 
bonuses as a less costly pay-for-performance alternative to merit pay.56  However, these 
systems are unpopular with employees for their implicit anti-entitlement nature.  Lump 
sum bonuses are widespread across the DoD for purposes of retention and recruitment.57  
They represent a cost-effective way to smooth the force structure during periods of 
fluctuating unemployment, particularly in light of the bureaucratic process by which the 
military pay scale is modified. 
Mary Kay Cosmetics uses a classic spot award scheme.  In this type of 
compensation, payouts are immediately awarded for exceptional performance.  Such 
systems are used by 34% of all companies and are widely regarded as moderately to 
highly effective.   
 
56 Milkovich and Newman, 289, 2005. 
57 9th QRMC, 77, 2001. 
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b. Group Incentive Plans 
Other schemes focus on team based incentives.  These include gain 
sharing plans (e.g., United States Post Office, Xerox), stock ownership or option plans 
(e.g., PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Lincoln Electric), profit-sharing plans (e.g., Ford Motors), or 
earnings-at-risk plans (e.g., DuPont Fibers).  Other popular corporate examples for group 
incentive plans include General Electric, Corning Glass, 3M, and Saturn.58  The obvious 
advantage over individual incentive plans is increased teamwork.  A disadvantage is the 
“free-rider” problem in which some team members have the statistic propensity to “be 
carried” on the efforts of others with little productive contributions of their own.  
Frampton discusses this in his paper in greater detail.59   
For purposes of clarification and summary, the following table from the 
May 2002 Pay for Performance Report published by the Institute of Management and 
Administration is reproduced below as Table 2.   
 
Type of Plan 
Percent of Companies Reporting 
Effective for Achieving Corporate Goals
Long-term Executive Incentives 82 
Annual Bonus 79 
Individual Incentives 79 
Employee Stock Ownership 79 
Spot Awards 74 
Gain Sharing 73 
Lump-sum Merit Pay 67 
Profit Sharing 64 
 
Table 2.   
                                                
Overall Effectiveness of Alternative Reward Plans60 
 
 
58 Milkovich and Newman, 311, 2005. 
59 Frampton, 128, 2000. 
60 Milkovich and Newman, 279, 2005. 
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With so many available schemes, designing an ideal pay-for-performance 
system may appear an unattainable goal.  Realistically, no system is ever truly perfect; 
the companies that are able to assess and reassess the fit of their compensation strategies 
typically see the best results.  Successful schemes sometimes take years of trial and error 
before any indication of payoff is measurable.  For many organizations, neither the cost 
of investment in a new pay system nor the risk of its implementation outweighs the 
perceived benefit.   
 
C. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON PERFORMANCE BASED PAY 
Before broaching the two important topics of NSPS and merit-based pay for the 
USMC, the following short summary of the strengths and weaknesses of pay-for-
performance is provided: 
 
1. Strengths  
By this point, the rationale behind linking individual performance to 
compensation should be clear.  “The research evidence shows that merit pay systems, in 
general, have a significant positive impact on employee performance and on 
organizational productivity.”61  Variations of such systems are widespread throughout the 
private sector and, as discussed next, are gaining momentum in the public sector.   
 
2. Weaknesses 
It should also be understood at this point that critics cite potentially damaging 
effects on organizational cohesion, and in turn diminished morale and productivity, as the 
primary weakness of pay-for-performance systems.  Authors Baker, James, and Murphy 
summarize the significance of this consequence in their Journal of Finance article 
“Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory”:  
 
61 Terpestra and Honoree, “Employees’ Responses to Merit Pay Inequity,” 51, January/ February 
2005. 
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The costs of dealing with many of the problems induced by merit systems 
simply outweigh the limited organizational benefits they offer… there is a 
large [behavioral literature] arguing that treating employees differently 
from each other is detrimental to employee morale…  It’s difficult to 
provide an economic explanation for why horizontal equity is desirable, 
and yet it seems to be a powerful force that drives firms towards 
consistency of pay within job type, and even across job type when 
employees are viewed as being of “comparable worth.62
They further assert that these effects are not the result of the pay-for-performance 
system being ineffective, but rather too effective in motivating the wrong types of 
behaviors from employees.  Potential long-term effects of unintended consequences are 
discussed in later chapters. 
 
D. NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
A situation that bears similarities to performance pay for the Marine Corps is the 
advent of like systems in the federal government.  Several Congressional initiatives to 
establish a performance based pay system for the Civil Service have occurred over the 
past few decades.  During the 1970s, in an effort to energize the Federal Pay System 
using a methodology borrowed from private industry, Congress passed the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978, which included a merit-pay system.63  In 1984, Congress attempted 
to reinvigorate the dawdling GS merit pay system by creating the Performance 
Management and Recognition System (PMRS) that attempted to refocus the incentives 
on achievements.  In their article “Public Personnel Management,” however, James Perry 
and Beth Ann Petrakis cited “no evidence that the pay-for-performance principles of 
PMRS improved organizational performance.”64  PMRS was unofficially abandoned in 
1991 and research does not reveal any considerable efforts to initiate a more effective 
performance based system until the present.   
GS Civil Service workers have typically been paid and promoted in a step-wise 
manner that is reputed to reward time in the system over superior performance.  A GS 
 
62 Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 6-7, July 1988. 
63 Holliman, 8, 1983. 
64 Perry and Petrakis, 359, 1988. 
 employee is assigned a pay grade according to his job description and employee 
qualifications.  He is then promoted by steps annually for steps one through four, bi-
annually for steps five through seven, and every three years for steps eight through ten.  
For promotion to a higher grade (not a “step”), the employee must apply for or be 
promoted to a new job commensurate with that grade.  Table 3 shows the current pay 





Table 3.   
                                                
2005 General Schedule Salary Table66 
 
To reward superior performance, government organizations with GS workers 
typically have an allotment of funds within their O&M account set aside to make “on the 
spot” or “end of year” rewards.  These awards span the range of $100 to $10,000, 
depending on the employees’ relative pay grade and the significance of their 
accomplishments.67  Unfortunately, some perceive that many federal workers are often 
 
65 Defense Finance and Accounting Service, [http://www.dfas.mil/], last accessed October 2005. 
66 Office of Personnel and Management website, http://www.opm.gov/oca/05tables/indexGS.asp], last 
accessed November 2005. 
67 Lee and Straus, A01, May 2004. 
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rewarded just for showing up.  Supervisors support this mentality by making an even 
distribution of available bonus pay funds in order to avoid making hard choices. When 
questioned in a 2002 survey by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), less than 33 
percent of federal workers claimed the awards system had a positive effect on their 
performance.68
In addition to the need for flexibility and the desire to increase incentives for its 
better-quality performers, the federal government recognizes that superior workers are 
often paid less than more senior and less productive civil servants who have more time in 
the system.  In 2003, Congress, the OPM, DoD, and the White House teamed up to 
rewrite the rules for pay in the Civil Service and NSPS was eventually passed as part of 
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004.69 This system will use the Contribution-
based Compensation and Appraisal System (CCAS)—commonly referred to as the “new 
band system”—to correlate workers’ pay to a graphical scale relating job performance, 
expectation, and pay.  Highlights from the proposal include: 
• Simplified pay banding structure, allowing flexibility in assigning work  
• Pay increases based on performance, rather than longevity  
• A performance management system that requires supervisors to set clear 
expectations (linked to DoD's goals and objectives) and employees to be 
accountable  
• Streamlined and more responsive hiring processes  
• More efficient, faster procedures for addressing disciplinary and 
performance problems, while protecting employee due process rights  
• A labor relations system that recognizes our national security mission and 
the need to act swiftly to execute that mission, while preserving collective 
bargaining rights of employees 70 
The idea is to assign GS workers by field of occupation to one of three career 
paths with “broad band levels.”  Once the employee is assigned a band correlating to her 
 
68Lee and Straus, A01, May 2004.  
69 NSPS Website, [www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/nspsdocs.html/], last accessed October 2005. 
70 Ibid. 
 former GS level, she will initially receive the same pay.   Figure 4 illustrates the general 
association between the old and new systems.71  
 
Figure 4.   General Schedule Categories under NSPS72 
 
After a year of working under the new system, federal employees will receive 
their performance evaluation score, called the Overall Contribution Score (OCS), and 
their performance will be compared to their pay on the ranges depicted on the scale in 
Figure 5.73  If an employee’s score is higher than his current assigned salary, he will be 
eligible for a portion of the difference.  If the Civil Servant’s pay falls out higher than his 
OCS shows he should be paid, he will not be eligible for any bonuses, cost of living 
increases, or promotion and may even receive a reduction in pay.74  The calculation 
techniques are somewhat complex, but the bottom line is evident: superior performance 
will result in increased pay; sub-par performance will generate a net decrease in pay.  
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71 Acquisition Support Center Website, [http://asc.army.mil/divisions/pm/acqdemo_ccas.cfm], last 
accessed October 2005. 
72 NSPS Website, [http://204.36.7.160/dlpps.php], last accessed December 2005. 
73 Acquisition 16.  
74 Ibid, 12. 
  
Figure 5.   NSPS Pay Banding75 
 
As one might expect, this performance based system has received mix reviews.    
If this new structure succeeds, it threatens the very nature of a culture; security and 
economy of effort will be exchanged for performance and appropriate rewards.  While 
the fast-track personnel will be recognized and rewarded, personnel not regarded as 
superior performers will receive reduced pay, fewer promotions, and potentially less job 
security.  The previously mentioned difficulty of ensuring a reputable performance 
evaluation system remains as a substantial hurdle, particularly with increased media 
coverage and union activity.  Barr notes: “The change will challenge officials to show 
that pay raises are fair and untainted by politics.”76  At the time of this writing, NSPS is 
currently fallowed in the U.S. court system, held captive to a number of Federal 
Employee unions 
 
E. MERIT-BASED PAY: A FIT FOR THE USMC 
We must therefore be prepared to cope, even better, to thrive in an 
environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction.77
Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-11B, Marine Corps Values: 
A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders 
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75 NSPS Website, [http://204.36.7.160/dlpps.php], last accessed December 2005. 
76 Barr, 3, “Long, Hard Road From Here to Performance-Based Pay,” July 2005. 
77 Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-11B, 16-10. 
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To this point, many characteristics of pay-for-performance systems have been 
identified and discussed, but none were directly linked to the Marine Corps.  The 
following sections detail attributes of the USMC as an organization that make it a 
promising candidate to benefit from performance based pay.  Specific details are not 
covered until Chapter III. 
 
1. Organizational and Individual Values 
It has already been stated that behaviorists cannot identify with 100 percent 
certainty what characteristics of a pay system best motivate people.  Rather, a system that 
rewards any given mix of longevity, experience, and performance is surely the best fit for 
one individual but not another.  In general, however, successful organizations are the 
ones able to align individual and organizational values.  Given its reputation and history 
of consistent successes, the USMC arguably has been successful in this endeavor.  Major 
General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, best describes Marine 
Corps lineage: 
Not just what we do, our ethos is who we are and what we believe. Today, 
as in the past, the spirit of this ethos is born in the hearts of men and 
women drawn to the Corps by a common calling--a desire to serve, and a 
sense of duty born in ideals like patriotism, valor, and fidelity. It grows as 
they are transformed--from citizen-patriots of the great American stock, 
into Marine--mind, body, and soul. Like knights of legend, Marines are 
not made, they are transformed. They are forged in the furnace of 
hardship, tempered by the bonds of shared hazard, sharpened by the 
whetstones of training and education, and honed to a fine edge by 
innovation and ingenuity. Marines, once transformed, are forever 
changed--instilled with beliefs, ideals and virtues that have meaning 
deeper than words. Today, some of these ideals--honor, courage, 
commitment--form the bedrock of our institutional and individual 
character. They are our core values.78
Lyons and Ben-Ora ask of leaders considering performance pay systems: 
“Culturally, can your organization embody a pay-for-performance philosophy?  Do your 
employees trust management?  Is there an open line of communication between staff and 
 
78 Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-11B, 2-9. 
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management?”79  It is intuitive that having an organization made up of proud and 
dedicated members is an ideal foundation from which to initiate positive change.  In their 
September 2005 European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology article, 
Martin, Jones, and Callan cite: 
Results showed that employees whose perceptions of the organization and 
environment in which they were working (that is, psychological climate) 
were more positive, were more likely to appraise change favorably and 
report better adjustment in terms of higher job satisfaction, psychological 
well-being, and organizational commitment, and lower absenteeism and 
turnover intentions.80  
One can argue that the same rationale holds true in the Corps, as Marines generally trust 
their leadership and take pride in being considered elite.  Such an organization, one that 
touts “Know yourself and seek self-improvement” as a basic leadership trait,81 could 
easily benefit by properly adopting some of the tenets from a proven performance-
increasing compensation system.  This can be described as a “Virtuous Circle,”82 a 
phenomenon where the value of pay-for-performance schemes is greatest in organizations 
that already experience success.  
The Marine Corps seeks a range of personalities to fill its ranks.  It is safe to 
presume, however, that Marines in general exhibit characteristics more closely 
resembling those of a risk-taker over someone who is risk-averse.83  While other 
personality traits surely influence Marines’ attraction to and satisfaction with the Corps 
from the standpoint of its compensation system, a performance based system would well 




79 Lyons and Ben-Ora, 36, March/April 2002. 
80 Martin, Jones, and Callan, 263, September 2005. 
81 U.S. Marine Corps Leadership Principles, [http://www.uspharmd.com/usmc/mcleader.htm], last 
accessed October 2005. 
82 Milkovich and Newman, 52, 2005.  
83 Ricks, 20, 1997. 
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2. FITREP System 
The USMC began using their current Performance Evaluation System (PES) in 
1999.  This system requires two Marines senior in rank and in the same chain-of-
command to evaluate every Sergeant through Brigadier General using a standardized 
Fitness Report (FITREP).  The Reporting Senior (RS) is the Marine’s immediate 
supervisor while the Reviewing Officer is typically the RS’s Reporting Senior, or the 
next officer senior in the chain of command of the unit in which the Marine serves.  At a 
minimum, each Marine is reported on once a year, but in many instances this occurs more 
than once (e.g., change of RS/RO, promotion, job transfer).  Aside from the shared 
responsibilities of accurate administrative data on the Marine Reported On (MRO), the 
RS is responsible for grading his subordinate in 14 attributes (listed in Figure 6), and both 
the RS and RO are obligated to provide a narrative of the MRO’s performance and future 
potential.  The Manpower Management Support Branch describes their method: 
The system recognizes the inherent high quality of the individual 
Marine and accounts for the fact that the "average" Marine is in fact 
outstanding. Listed under the five main areas of evaluation are 14 
attributes in the form of Performance Anchored Rating Scales (PARS). 
Each of the PARS provides a complete descriptor for the evaluated 
attribute, reduces the requirement for written comments, and evaluates the 
Marine against definitive degrees of performance. 
Markings of "A" to "H" correspond to three scaled descriptions to 
stimulate the Reporting Senior's cognitive reasoning in making the 
appropriate selection. The scales run from left to right; each is distinctly 
separate from the others. For each attribute, the Reporting Senior must 
give consideration to the individual's grade, experience within grade, and 
accumulated experience as a Marine. The "A" marking is adverse, the "H" 
for not observed, and "B" through "G" cover the spectrum of ratings with 
"G" being the highest. A justification box has been added in each section 
to justify adverse or top ratings in any of the 14 attributes.84
A full example of a Marine Corps fitness report is found in Appendix A. 
 
84 USMC Performance Evaluation System, [https://www.mmsb.usmc.mil/newpes.htm], last accessed 
October 2005. 
  
Figure 6.   Expected Articulation of the USMC FITREP Competencies in the USMC 
Strategy85 
 
An important element of the USMC PES is its automation.  Headquarters Marine 
Corps (HQMC) compiles and processes all Marine FITREPS in a centralized and 
automated system.  By managing this database of all rankings and grades submitted by 
RSs and ROs, they are then able to normalize these scores for inflationary tendencies, or 
“reporting creep.”  This is particularly useful for USMC Promotion Boards or Selection 
Boards as a Marine’s file is available to be fairly presented based on normalized FITREP 
 39
                                                 
85 Jobst and Palmer, 61, March 2005. 
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markings.  While a superior Marine may be labeled “Outstanding” by his RS or RO in the 
narrative section of his FITREP, he is only comparatively outstanding if his scores have 
him fall out as a top Marine in those same RS or RO’s cumulative rankings of all Marines 
they have reported on.  Greater detail on this system can be found in Appendix B. 
In their analysis of the USMC PES, Mark Jobst and Jeffery Palmer ask the 
question of whether or not the FITREP appropriately links performance attributes with 
the USMC’s strategy.   In one segment of their research, they conclude “USMC officers 
believe the FITREP attributes were not all equally important within, and across each 
MOS – although the USMC assesses them as such.”86  They also recommend that further 
analysis be conducted in order to further assess the effectiveness of the weighted-average 
FITREP marking system as a tool to demarcate Marines, and that performance attributes 
be explicitly linked to the strategic goals of the USMC.  Most assuredly, the USMC PES 
is not perfect and will need adjusting to meet the changing needs of the Corps.  However, 
its ability to break out above or below average performers in a centralized, yet discrete 
method is significant to this project.   
 
3. Signaling Theory 
“A pay system reflects the values that guide an employer’s behaviors and underlie 
its treatment of its employees.  The pay system mirrors the company’s image and 
reputation.”87   Furthermore, Milkovich and Newman attest: “Employers deliberately 
design pay levels and mix as part of a strategy that signals both prospective and current 
employees the kinds of behaviors that are sought.”88  These statements suggest that aside 
from influencing internal effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability, an organization’s pay 
structure sends an implicit message to outside stakeholders as well.  As marketers quip 
“Differentiate or die” as a slogan to private corporations, a similar opportunity lies for the 
USMC in revolutionizing their antiquated compensation system. 
 
86 Jobst and Palmer, 6, March 2005. 
87 Milkovich and Newman, 39, 2005. 
88 Ibid, 196. 
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The Marine Corps has a reputation as being a change leader amongst the military 
branches.  Author/journalist Thomas Ricks states “The Marine Corps ‘works’ as a 
culture, and is adept at addressing its own faults.”89  Centuries of success portray that the 
Marines demand outstanding performance from their most trusted asset.  Given their 
effectiveness in combat and in garrison in comparison to the other service branches, it is 
the Marine Corps that could most effectively establish an ownership culture embracing a 
performance based Human Resource Strategy. 
 
4. NPS Survey 
In an effort to enhance understanding of Marines’ perceptions towards their own 
compensation system, a web-based survey was conducted of the Naval Postgraduate 
School Marine Officer population.  The limitations of scope for this survey are 
acknowledged: no enlisted Marines were surveyed; the population of Marines surveyed 
consists of graduate students not serving in the Fleet Marine Forces; and the large 
majority of respondents were Captains and Majors.  However, while this survey may not 
present conclusive opinions for any single Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and 
pay grade, it served its design by attaining preliminary impressions and insights for some 
pay grades across a large variety of MOSs.  
The full results of the survey are included in Appendix C.  They can be 
interpreted in multiple ways, but for purposes of clarity and discussion, results are broken 
down into three categories: Compensation Adequacy (Table 4), Performance Evaluation 
and Rewards (Table 5), and Performance Pay (Table 6).  
 
a. Compensation Adequacy 
A vast majority of respondents indicate that they are adequately paid, 
though one must acknowledge the limited pay grades and experience levels that make up 
the NPS Marine officer population.   There is no consensus as to the whether or not the 
Marine Corps financially rewards good performance, but 77% agree that performance is 
                                                 
89 Ricks, 20, 1997. 
 ancillary to longevity.  Survey results also indicate that only 31% of respondents perceive 
pay equity across the Corps’ many fields. 
In short, the most conclusive results regarding compensation adequacy are 
that most Marines are content with their pay (pay is effective), a likely product of the 
specific field of respondents.  An unsubstantiated conclusion on the questions in this 
category linking performance to compensation is that most Marines have never been 
asked or really considered the role of pay as an influential factor of performance.  They 
believe the Corps’ compensation system favors longevity, indicative of the perceived 
inefficiency of the simplistic military pay tables.  Lastly, Marines are paid in an 
inequitable manner across occupational specialties. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
I am adequately compensated by the U.S. Marine 
Cor s. p 
1% (1) 14% (21) 11% (16) 59% (86) 16% (23) 
I feel that I am financially compensated to put forth 
the extr  effort. a 
10% (15) 24% (35) 27% (40) 32% (47) 7% (10) 
The U.S. Marine Corps pays its Marines only enough 
to keep them in the Marine Corps.  
5% (7) 28% (41) 25% (36) 36% (53) 6% (9) 
The U.S. Marine Corps pays its Marines fairly from 
MOS to MOS.  
10% (15) 38% (55) 21% (31) 28% (40) 3%(5) 
Pay provided by the U.S. Marines is enough to 
adequately motivate trong performance. s 
7% (10) 34% (49) 26% (37) 32% (46) 2% (3) 
The U.S. Marine Corps pay system favors 
performance o er longevity. v 
25% (36) 52% (76) 14% (20) 10% (14) 0% (0) 
 
Table 4.   NPS Survey Results: Compensation Adequacy 
 
b. Performance Evaluation and Rewards 
Marine respondents indicate mixed perceptions towards the FITREP, but 
68% are neutral or agree that it is an effective performance-measuring tool.  70% have 
the same opinion of the promotion process.  Conversely, 67% of respondents are neutral 
or disagree that individual awards adequately reward superior performance.  Only 18% 




Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The USMC Fitness Report System fairly assesses my 
performance.  
6% (8) 26% (38) 21% (30) 44% (64) 3% (5) 
Individual Awards adequately reward superior 
performance.  
12% (17) 32% (47) 23% (34) 30% (43) 3% (4) 
I feel that promotions are an adequate reward for 
performance.  
6% (9) 25% (36) 22% (32) 38% (56) 9% (13) 
The Marine Corps adequately rewards outstanding 
performers with the current compensation plan.  
10% (14) 39% (56) 33% (48) 15% (22) 3% (5) 
 
Table 5.   NPS Survey Results: Performance Evaluation and Rewards 
 
c. Performance Pay 
Respondents exhibit a very even distribution of opinions on the Marine 
Corps changing its compensation system to reward performance.  72% indicate that they 
would put forth the same effort regardless, and only 22% agree that they would be more 
inclined to stay in the Corps should performance pay be adopted.  One interesting 
element of these responses is revealed in comparing two like questions: respondents 
exhibit a slightly favorable attitude towards “incorporating a small element of 
performance based pay into the Total Compensation Package,” but when a link between 
pay and the FITREP is made explicit, they indicate a less favorable opinion.  As is 
discussed in later sections, Marines will first need greater assurance that their 
performance evaluation system is fair before they are willing to put their pay on the 
line—even for the betterment of the organization. 
Survey results also further strengthen the preconception that there may be 
a negative impact on morale and unit integrity; this belief is better captured by the 







Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The Marine Corps should consider changing their pay 
system to reward outstanding performers.  
9% (13) 31% (45) 26% (38) 27% (39) 8% (11) 
Associating a part of individuals' pay with 
performance would adversely affect morale and unit 
integ ity. r 
2% (3) 23% (33) 24% (35) 39% (56) 12% (18) 
The Marine Corps would benefit by incorporating a 
small element of performance-based pay into the 
Total Compensation Package.  
6% (8) 26% (38) 23% (33) 38% (54) 8% (11) 
I would the put forth the same effort with or without 
the prospect of ear ing a 10% bonus. n 
2% (3) 17% (25) 9% (13) 46% (67) 26% (37) 
I should be paid more than another Marine of the 
same rank and Primary MOS if I am a better 
perfo mer. r 
9% (13) 36% (52) 25% (36) 25% (37) 5% (8) 
Above average Marines will not work any harder to 
earn additional ompensation.  c 
4% (6) 34% (49) 18% (27) 34% (49) 10% (15) 
I would be more likely to stay in the Marine Corps if 
part of my pay was linked to my performance.  
10% (15) 41% (60) 27% (39) 14% (21) 8% (11) 
A small annual bonus awarded to above average 
performers based upon normalized Fitness Report 
rankings would increase the overall effectiveness of 
the U.S. Marine Corps.
20% (26) 36% (52) 25%  (36) 21% (30) 1% (2) 
 
Table 6.   NPS Survey Results: Performance Pay 
 
d. NPS Survey Conclusions 
The hypothesis prior to conducting this survey was that the USMC 
adequately addressed all but individual equity in their compensation system and that it 
has limited means to recognize its best or penalize its poorest performers.  Based on the 
results of this web-based survey these preconceptions were proven true.  Respondents 
believe that the Marine Corps would benefit from adding some element of performance 
pay; however, they believe they should not do it for the potential negative effects on unit 
cohesion and devaluation of the intrinsic motivators of patriotism and esprit de corps.  
There are also indications that while both the Marine Corps compensation and 




these two systems are ready for integration.  It is recommended that a qualified agency 
conduct a similar survey on a more representative sample to achieve more useful 
conclusions.   
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented of the complexities of designing a total compensation 
system.  Elements of basic pay model as described by Milkovich and Newman provided 
background for designing and establishing an appropriate and effective compensation 
system, and vast historic DoD analyses further addressed this subject as it applies to the 
military. 
Top-level organizational strategy and organizational goals, values, and culture 
should all steer an organization to an appropriate compensation system.  The Marine 
Corps is an ideal candidate for implementing a pay-for-performance system, a proven 
method to increase performance, for its level of continued successes, small size, well-
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III. RECOMMENDATION FOR A PERFORMANCE BASED 
BONUS 
We must create a compensation system that will allow the DoN to compete 
successfully for talent, encourage and reward performance, and recognize 
contribution. 
Department of the Navy Human Capital Strategy, June 2004 
Leveraging the theory behind pay-for-performance systems and the rationale for 
recommending the Marine Corps implement some pay-for-performance variant, this 
chapter discusses actual recommendations for USMC leadership to consider.  As the 
chapter’s title suggests, this project ascertains that a performance based bonus, a lump-
sum hybrid, is best suited for the Marine Corps.  This is a walk through the rationale 
behind the recommendation and concludes with some suggested details on the suggested 
performance based bonus. 
 
A. REQUISITE CHARACTERISTICS 
What one might consider “requisite characteristics” for a pay-for-performance 
scheme to best serve the USMC will vary from Marine to Marine.  While it is impossible 
to satisfy all of the stakeholders involved, basic attributes worthy of consideration are 
described below. 
 
1. Benefits Must Outweigh Costs  
Like most organizational changes, decisions that modify compensation are highly 
visible and scrutinized within and outside of an organization.  A basic question to ask is 
“Do the perceived benefits of making the change outweigh the perceived costs?”  This 
question addresses a fundamental economic issue, yet the more subjective the 
performance measures in a system, the more difficult it is to assess the utility of any 
given action or input.  In the case of USMC compensation, each stakeholder has his own 
subjective opinion about the importance of Marine Corps pay and the potential effects of 
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linking some part of it to performance.  The NPS survey conducted in support of this 
project suggests that many Marines are likely to have a negative first impression of the 
idea due to their inherent loyalty to their unit and the Corps.  Therefore the perceived 
costs for many, whether accurate or not, will outweigh the corresponding benefits.  This 
is not to suggest that each Marine must agree with the change, but member buy-in is 
essential in realizing successful pay-for-performance system design and 
implementation—particularly in the eyes of the leadership.  In the end, if the leadership 
cannot perceive a net benefit for the Marine Corps’ performance based pay, the idea 
should not be implemented. 
The reader may have noticed that the word “perceived” has been used thus far to 
describe costs and benefits, possibly prompting a natural digression to a discussion on 
values.  In reality, there is no way to measure the actual values of the Marine Corps.  The 
Corps espouses Honor, Courage, and Commitment as core values, but clearly these are 
characteristics difficult to measure.  “Courage” may appear as one of fourteen attributes 
on a Marine’s FITREP, but descriptive phrases such as “Guided by conscience in all 
actions” are vague at best.  Despite its relevance, this line of discussion goes beyond the 
scope of this project and is acknowledged as one of many limitations.   
 
2. Equitability / Efficiency / Effectiveness 
As introduced in the previous chapter, compensation systems require balancing 
equitability via experience, longevity, and performance; efficiency in utilizing resources; 
and effectiveness in meeting organizational strategic goals.  These characteristics are 
considered throughout this chapter. 
NPS survey results indicate the Marine Corps is effective in adequately 
compensating the population of officer respondents, but not equitable.  Furthermore, a 
vast consensus of respondents (over 75%) indicates that the USMC pay system favors 
longevity over performance, suggesting that the system is also inefficient.  While the 
Marine Corps is regularly successful in performing its missions, it appears its pay system 
sacrifices equitability and efficiency for the sake of effectiveness.  Part of the reasoning  
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for this is simply because it can—it has the federal government funding its workforce.  
Another more influential cause, one all too common in large organizations, is that it has 
always been this way.   
One vantage is that incorporating pay-for-performance into the Marine Corps’ 
compensations system trades the perceived level of “equitability” amongst the ranks for 
“efficiency.”  Detractors cite a loss in unit cohesion due to an increased favoritism should 
pay be linked to performance.  Yet, the basis of the current promotion process, a process 
believed to be an effective tool by 47% of the NPS respondents (31% disagree, 22% were 
neutral), is individual performance.  Therefore, the single most important tool for 
rewarding excellent performance is based on years of FITREPs written by the same 
Marines that would continue to author them in a pay-for-performance system.     
The significance of this last idea can be exemplified through the following 
hypothetical example:  an outstanding Marine serves in a unit that does not deploy to a 
combat environment during his first seven to ten years in the Marine Corps.  When 
screened for promotion, he may be selected with his peers who have also satisfied 
essential requisites.  However, when the time comes for him to be considered for 
command of a unit, or some other career defining billet, he may not receive the same 
consideration as a peer (even if that peer is a poorer performer) who deployed to the 
theater of operations.  This is only a hypothetical situation, but it is relevant to the 
concepts of effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability as they pertain to Marines’ 
incentives and compensation.  In this realistic scenario, the outstanding Marine’s 
potential would be underutilized and the Corps could have a less qualified Marine in a 
command billet.    The superior performer could resign or could choose to stop 
performing at any level greater than the minimum required, recognizing his future is 
limited and he can retire in a few years with a lifelong pension.  Either way, had this 
Marine been compensated for superior performance without regard for his arbitrary duty 
assignments, he may be inclined to remain and continue his high standards of 




                                                
3. Fitness Report 
With the Performance Evaluation System centrally managed by Headquarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC), the USMC has the technology to support a pay-for-performance 
scheme.  Fitness Reports are normalized to reflect relative markings per evaluator.  
Therefore, markings on all evaluated Marines by common Reporting Seniors (RSs) 
and/or Reviewing Officers (ROs) present actual standings throughout the Corps.  
Additionally, Marines are all evaluated on their ability to write Fitness Reports on their 
subordinates, providing a self-imposed incentive within the system to perform this duty 
correctly.  Unfortunately, despite having been in use since 1999, many Marines do not 
conceptually understand the equalization that occurs through the normalization process.  
In fact, the system is still referred to as the “new system” by most Marines, even though 
it is over six years old.  Comments left by the NPS survey respondents reveal a general 
lack of understanding about the USMC PES.  The natural by-product of this deficiency is 
a lack of confidence in using the FITREP as a measurement tool in determining 
performance based pay.  
A number of Marines fear that favoritism pervades the PES system.90  This 
presents an obvious and considerable obstacle to achieving member buy-in for 
performance pay in the Corps.  In actuality, these weaknesses do not present a significant 
challenge for tying performance to pay for two reasons.  First, while inflationary 
tendencies and “reporting creep” may occur, intentionally or unintentionally, a single RS 
or RO would not have the lone influence to award or withhold a Marine’s performance 
bonus.  By design, the system would award only the comparatively superior performers 
throughout the multiple ranks and MOSs in an indirect manner.  Thus, an RS may rank a 
Marine in his personal top quartile, but this is no guarantee that the Marine ends up in the 
top quartile among his particular segment of the Corps.   
Pay-for-performance is primarily a tool to encourage and reward excellent 
performance on a short term basis.  While evaluators may feel inclined to elevate their 
FITREPs to make their Marines appear superior in the near-term, they dilute their own 
 
90 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
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markings in the long-term, rendering their previous evaluations comparatively inferior.  
RSs and ROs understand this self-monitoring aspect of the Marine Corps PES and, as 
mentioned, they themselves are evaluated on their ability to appraise subordinates fairly.  
The likelihood is extremely low that the officers who act as Reporting Seniors and 
Reviewing Officers as a whole will sacrifice their evaluation baselines and risk their 
professional reputation and own marks as FITREP writers to award one or a few Marines 
a small bonus, particularly when they don’t know if their efforts will even work.   
 
B. OPTIONS 
When it comes to compensation systems, there is no single solution.  Some mix of 
fixed and variable pay is appropriate, but it depends on the situation.  This is certainly the 
case for the multiple variations of performance based pay available for the Marine Corps’ 
consideration.  Some of the more popular options were discovered through interviews 
and research involving analogous organizations; they are discussed in order to provide 
further support of the recommended performance based bonus. 
 
1. Merit-Pay  
Merit pay, by a textbook definition, “links increases in base pay (called merit 
increases) to how highly employees are rated on a subjective performance evaluation.”91  
In Chapter II, these schemes were scrutinized for their tendency to fluctuate wages or 
salaries from period to period by incrementally changing base level pay for individual 
employees.  This methodology seems inappropriate for the military, both for its 
complexity and the entitlement mentality it conveys.  
 
2. Pay Banding 
Traditional pay banding, the bedrock for the new National Security Personnel 
System (NSPS), is being implemented against a tide of resistance in the DoD civilian 
sector.  It is an extremely complicated undertaking for the DoD civilians. The 
 
91 Milkovich and Newman, 287, 2005. 
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characteristic of pay banding that makes it a poor choice for the USMC as well is the 
prospect of Marines losing pay.  While the potential for earning a bonus for above 
average performance may better align the individual Marine’s goals with those of the 
Corps’, the opposite likely is true as well.  Marines losing pay at the end of the year 
suggests that they are being punished.  This would have a negative net effect on the 
Corps as a whole; far outweighing the benefits associated with having some receive 
increased pay. 
 
3. Group Based Incentive  
Group based incentive compensation schemes promote increased teamwork, but 
are not good for today’s Corps for several reasons.  First, pitting one unit against another 
could harbor internal rivalries that currently do not exist in the Marine Corps.  There is 
also the “free-rider” problem of strong performers propping up the weaker ones.  Finally, 
certain units, like certain individual Marines, get “lucky” in their scheduling cycle.  It 
would be very difficult to compare a non-deployed unit conducting training or refitting 
against a comparable unit in a combat environment.  
Group-related merit based pay is also too subjective and complex.  Marines 
continually rotating in and out of units and the leadership/personnel assignment balancing 
by higher headquarters are two of many reasons it would be difficult to fairly evaluate 
“unit success.”  The Marine Corps does not have a performance evaluation system at the 
unit level that compares to PES.  Aside from the enormous complications in designing 
one, from a strategic standpoint, attempts to create such a system would likely meet so 
much resistance they would be undermined at the outset. 
 
4. Lump Sum Bonuses  
The simplest pay-for-performance scheme is a lump sum bonus.  This method is 
ubiquitous within the private sector for rewarding excellent individual performance.  
However, lump sum bonuses experience no fewer complications than other performance 
pay methods in fairly differentiating recipients.  Lump sum bonuses can easily be 
misused, particularly if the wrong levels of leadership within the organization control 
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their distribution.  Likewise, the entitlement culture that may potentially arise should 
bonuses be too liberally awarded cultivates lethargy for members overly accustomed to 
receiving them.   
One detractor of a lump sum bonus for the USMC in particular is the perception 
of distributive justice across the ranks.  For example, one Marine Sergeant receiving a 10 
percent bonus, worth around $2,500, could easily create an atmosphere of resentment and 
distrust.   
 
C. PERFORMANCE BASED BONUS 
After weighing the strengths and weaknesses of various pay-for-performance 
schemes, a performance based bonus (PBB) is considered to be the best alternative.  This 
recommendation considers pay effectiveness as well as distribution equitability in its 
design.  To reiterate, this model is only one of countless ways to implement performance 
pay into the Marine Corps; this example simply demonstrates that it can be done.  Based 
on the preceding discussion, the underlying assumptions going into this recommendation 
include: 
• The net benefits of this system outweigh the net costs. 
• The USMC Personnel Evaluation System is an effective method to 
measure Marines’ performance. 
• Marines will work harder given the prospect of earning this bonus. 
Other key characteristics of the PBB follow: 
 
1. Segmentation 
Equitability is a critical concern in implementing this system.  One way to make 
the system equitable across the Marine Corps is to segment by rank and Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS).  Each of these segments makes up a small percentage of 
the entire population of Sergeants and above.  Therefore, each segment could receive a 
proportional amount of bonus money, creating a simple and understandable design.  
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Distributing money by segment, USMC leadership could selectively choose 
which segment gets how much to maximize the overall effect, or “bang for the buck.”  
For example, Marine Colonels may be less motivated to increase effort for a given bonus 
than a Staff Sergeant, in which case the Corps could earn a greater return on bonus 
dollars dedicated to the latter rank.  In this case, the more strenuous specialties could 
receive a greater relative share of bonus money.  One way to address this is to set ceiling 
and floor constraints on how much a single segment can collect relative to their 
proportional size or wage bill in the Corps.  This method is demonstrated later during the 
description of the PBB model.  The bottom-line is that the Marine Corps needs a fair 
method for apportioning bonus money, and it should consider retaining some leeway to 
provide bonuses to those segments which promise the greatest return on their investment.   
  
2. Pay Amount and Schedule 
Current literature suggests it takes an additional ten percent of one’s annual pay to 
comprise a bonus that has a discernible effect.92  Recognizing this norm, the optimization 
model to be presented keeps all bonuses at ten percent of basic pay; but higher 
effectiveness could theoretically be extracted by distributing a portion of that percentage 
to all Marines so that every Marine gets some bonus between one and ten percent.  More 
of a marketing and buy-in technique, this will keep Marines who may be struggling from 
feeling disenfranchised – they will be more likely to remain focused on increasing their 
bonus share, rather than quitting out of frustration had they received nothing.  The bonus 
should be paid on a monthly basis and not as a lump sum bonus to alleviate (though not 
eliminate) the sense of inequity.  While the topic of budgeting goes beyond the scope of 
this analysis, a portion of the Marine Corps personnel appropriation could be “fenced” to 
present a reliable and reputable system, as is currently done for the Enlistment, Selective 
Reenlistment, and Critical Skill Retention Bonuses.  In theory, the savings incurred 
through a more effective work force and greater retention offsets the monetary cost of 
 
92 Liccione, 45, March/April 2002 
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merit based pay.93  However, this is not likely to be the case for the Marine Corps as its 
force structure is foremost determined by strategic, operational, and tactical necessity.  
 
3. Indirect Recipient Determination 
The awarding of the bonus will be indirect.  Unit commanders will certainly serve 
a critical role in determining bonus recipients, but it will only be through their normal 
participation in the FITREP system.  Under this system, one Marine will not be able to 
financially reward another.  This concern was voiced multiple times by NPS survey 
respondents, and it is therefore considered critical that this facet be emphasized, no 
matter what pay-for-performance scheme is selected.  
The process of determining how many bonuses are awarded obviously depends, in 
part, on how much money is dedicated to the program.  The number of bonuses will also 
be affected by their distribution amongst the various segments, as basic pay increases 
with rank in this model.  Once the number of bonuses is determined, so too is the average 
percentage of Marines eligible for a PBB per segment.  This percentage can be linked to 
the normalized rankings produced via the USMC FITREP tracking system at 
Headquarters Marine Corps.  Obviously, more bonus money means a larger number of 
Marines receive more meaningful bonuses. 
 
4. Other Considerations 
Should the Marine Corps incorporate performance pay elements into its 
compensation system, numerous additional details will need to be resolved.  One such 
issue is Marines serving in “non-observed” billets.  It is recommended that Marines 
serving in such billets remain ineligible for a PBB during that period.   
Another consideration is that by linking PBB to the FITREP, only E-5s and above 
are eligible for a bonus as E-4s and below are evaluated in a different manner.  Making 
up approximately 60 percent of the Marine Corps, E-4s and below represent a majority of 
 
93 Terpestra and Honoree, “Employees’ Responses to Merit Pay Inequity,” 51, January/February 2005. 
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the Marine Corps.94  The effects of this shortcoming are somewhat alleviated by the 
current performance recognition norms already in place at these most junior ranks, but 
their inclusion into the pay-for-performance system should be considered in further 
analysis. 
 
5. Optimization Model  
The purpose for creating an optimization model is to help determine the best 
method of awarding performance bonuses.  Due to the complexity in distributing bonuses 
across multiple segments, this computer aided decision support tool can easily capture the 
intent of the equitability, efficiency, effectiveness design characteristics discussed earlier 
in part two of this chapter.  This model will prove particularly useful for managers to 
later perform sensitivity analysis or quickly determine new results by modifying inputs.  
Appendix D depicts such a model created using Microsoft Excel (Solver).  This model 
represents only a crude depiction of what actual implementation would require.  In 
designing this model, segments are limited to the officer ranks of 2nd Lieutenant (O-1) 
through Colonel (O-6) and are broken down into four basic specialties (an obvious over-
simplification): Ground Combat Arms (e.g., Infantry, Artillery), Ground Support (e.g., 
Intelligence, Supply, Logistics, Finance), Aviation (i.e., Pilots and Naval Flight Officers), 
and Aviation Support (e.g., Aircraft Maintenance, Aviation Supply).  The purpose of this 
model is to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing a performance based bonus to 
increase utility using the FITREP and Marines’ inputs as variables. 
Details of the PBB model are as follows. 
 
a. Objective Function 
The objective function for this optimization problem is to maximize the 
total utility attainable given multiple budgetary and percentage/equity constraints 
(discussed below).  For purposes of this model, utility is based on the expected increase 
in output of each segment of Marines.  Once the model computes the optimum number of 
 
94 Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2005, 238, 2005. 
 10 percent bonuses awarded to each segment, the total utility is computed by summing 
the products of the number of awards in each segment by the segments’ individual utility 
factor.  For clarification, the objective function can be expressed algebraically as: 
 
∑= enttorPerSegmUtilityFacmentrdedPerSegBonusesAwatyTotalUtiliMaximize *#)(  
 
b. Decision Variables 
The decision variables in this model are the number of bonus awards 
available per segment.   
 
c. Constraints 
Three constraints define the boundaries of this optimization model.  First, 
the total amount of money to be spent on bonus awards obviously constrains the total 
number of awards.  The other two constraints are both related to the discussion on 
segmentation in Section C-1 of this chapter.  It must be decided how many bonuses any 
given segment can receive relative to their actual percentage of the Corps.  A perfectly 
equitable system would require that the percentage of bonuses for each segment exactly 
equal their make-up of the total population.  However, various segments might receive 
higher utility from a bonus, so relaxing this equality constraint actually increases the total 
utility.  To incorporate this flexibility, the model includes constraints on the maximum 
and minimum percentage of bonuses for each segment.  This feature represents the ability 
of the Performance Based Bonus to award merit based compensation in an effective, yet 
equitable manner. 
 
d. Model Inputs 
This model requires only a few inputs before it can be optimized.  First, 
the amount of bonus money available to be distributed across the sixteen segments is a 
basic yet necessary consideration.  Similarly, the size of the bonus award as a percentage 
of basic pay also determines the number of bonuses available for distribution.  The 
equitability constraints, as described in previous section, must be input for Solver to 
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account for the overall degree of flexibility it has in distributing the bonuses across 
segments.  The final inputs, also the most subjective and difficult to estimate, are the 
individual segment utility factors. 
 
e. Model Results 
Various useful results are presented in the spreadsheet once Solver has 
computed the decision variable values that maximize the objective function.  These are 
automatically computed in the spreadsheet once the solution is accepted.  These include 
the total number of bonuses offered, the total value of these awards (which should always 
equal the exact amount of money available), the percentage of the budget for awards 
actually used (which should always equal 100 percent), and two tables that break down 
the award distribution—one by rank and one by MOS category.  The “final solution” to 
the model, labeled “Increased Efficiency” in the model, represents the ability of the 
Performance Based Bonus to award merit based compensation to achieve greater 
organizational efficiency.  This answer is derived by adding the net effects of the 
individual segments (the overall segment utility factor reflecting the quantity of bonuses 















3.2 $18,000 18.0% 24.0% 75%
2.4 $11,833 11.8% 11.3%
75%
12.2 $62,167 62.2% 54.0% 115%
1.5 $8,000 8.0% 10.7%
# Bonuses Bonus $ % Tot. Bonus $ %  Makeup Bonus $ % Per Segment
Bonus Breakdown by MOS
74%
0.0 $0 0.0% 0.0% 0%
0.3 $2,000 2.0% 2.7%
109%
3.0 $19,000 19.0% 25.3% 75%
15.1 $75,667 75.7% 69.3%
0%
0.9 $3,333 3.3% 2.7% 123%
0.0 $0 0.0% 0.0%
Bonus $ % Per Segment
4.870% 100.0% 19.3 12.8%
# Bonuses Bonus $ % Tot. Bonus $ %  Makeup
Increased Efficiency % of Budget Spent # Bonuses Offered % Receiving Bonus
   
Table 7.   Optimization Model Results 
 
f. NPS Example 
The model presented in Appendix D illustrates this optimization model in 
determining the best distribution of bonus money across the subject segments.  This 
explanation is intended to clarify details that may not be explicit or clear from looking at 
the model. 
The inputs into the model are $100,000 of bonus money available, 10 
percent of basic pay awards, and minimum and maximum segment shares of bonus 
equitability constraints set at 75 and 125%, respectively.  The final inputs, the individual 
segment utility factors, were determined by taking the weighted average results from the 
NPS Survey question “How much extra effort would you exert in order to earn a bonus 
equal to 10% of your basic pay?”  Across the segments, the following bonuses are 
available: 
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 GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 1.0 10.3 2.0 1.8
GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV




Table 8.   Optimized Distribution of  Performance Based Bonuses for NPS Survey 
Population 
 
As planned, each segment that is actually represented in the NPS survey 
respondent population receives some amount of bonus within 25 percent of the actual 
proportion of the total population.  These results are also broken down by rank and MOS 
category.  By rank, O-2s and O-3s receive a higher proportion of bonus money than O-4s 
and O-5s (123% and 109% versus 75% and 74%, respectively).  Additionally, Ground 
Support (GS) and Aviation Support (AS) MOS categories, at 115% and 105%, 
respectively, receive more than their proportionate share of bonus money compared to the 
Ground Combat Arms (GCA) or Aviator (AV) segments, at 75% each.  Both of these 
occurrences reflect the model’s bias to maximize total utility by favoring those segments 
that exhibit the highest potential increases in effort.   
The remaining results of this example are included in Appendix D as well 
as in the previous section.  As expected, 100% of the budgeted money is spent in 
awarding 19.3 bonuses.  As 150 Marine officers make up the population in this example, 
12.8% of the officers are eligible for the bonus overall, subject to the equitability 
constraints.   
 
6. Model Limitations 
The goal of this model is to demonstrate just one approach to distributing a 
performance based bonus—multiple limitations are acknowledged and have been 
considered in its design.  The most glaring limitation is the ability to measure the utility 
of increased effort across the segments.  With its narrow population of respondents, the 
NPS survey only scratches the surface in determining if a Marine would put out extra 
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effort at the prospect of receiving additional compensation.  The survey question “How 
much extra effort would you exert in order to earn a bonus equal to 10% of your basic 
pay?” is a crude means to measure of the actual effects of implementing the change.  
Over half of the survey respondents indicated that they would not work harder at all; 
many seemed insulted at the question in their individual remarks.  While people generally 
under-value the importance of their pay during surveys,95 there clearly must be a larger 
scale endeavor to predict these behaviors in the Corps. 
Another limitation of the model is the relative effects differing times-in-grade 
have on budgeting for each segment.  Bonuses within a prescribed segment will vary 
across recipients.  For example, a Marine crew chief on a C-130 aircrew could be a 
Sergeant with 5 years or a Staff Sergeant with fifteen to twenty years of service.  A 10 
percent bonus would cost considerably more for the Staff Sergeant than for the more 
junior Marine from the same segment.   
The model provides only a snapshot to determine the annual number of bonuses 
that can be awarded given various constraints.  However, as the USMC PES requires the 
submitting of FITREPs for different ranks at different times of the year, the system will 
need to reach a steady state to account for the required flow of funding to the program.  
Along these same lines, many Marines receive multiple FITREPs over the course of a 
single year.  No matter what the circumstances, however, every Marine will have at least 
one written report annually.  It is recommended that each segment’s rankings be 
established at this point of the year to determine the PBB recipients (i.e., Marines with 
multiple FITREPs over the period will have their markings consolidated—this task is 
already done on each Marines’ Master Brief Sheet). 
The decision variables in this mode and the number of bonus awards offered to 
each segment can be constrained to whole numbers.  After all, how can the USMC award 
fractions of bonuses?  However, this constraint must be removed to perform sensitivity 
analysis on the results of the Solver solution.  This limitation is a serious concern once  
 
 
95 Milkovich and Newman, 23, 2005. 
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the system achieves a steady state of operation.  Various PBB fund accounts could carry 
forward fractions of awards not given from year to year, in the aggregate achieving whole 
numbers of awards. 
Finally, this model loosely affiliates the multiple MOSs throughout the USMC 
into four categories for purposes of clarity.  A more realistic model could easily have fifty 
or more categories, greatly complicating its understanding, and in turn, its credibility.  
However, including more MOSs will help account for the various secondary MOSs in 
which Marines serve, a significant consideration given the large percentage of Marines 
serving in a billet other than their primary MOS at any given time. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the basic characteristics of a pay-for-performance scheme 
for the Marine Corps.  Several potential systems were compared, with the most 
appropriate fit for the Corps being a performance based bonus.  The characteristics of the 
recommended scheme were described in detail, including the basic design assumptions, a 
scheme to segment the Corps, bonus’ amounts and award scheduling, and award 
distribution.  Finally, an Excel based optimization model, Solver, was described that 
could be used in effectively, efficiently, and equitably awarding these bonuses.  NPS 









IV. IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
The Federal Government must adapt to a range of major trends and 
challenges in the nation and the world, and to respond, it must have the 
institutional capacity to plan more strategically, identify and react more 
expeditiously, and focus on achieving results.  Critical to the success of 
this transformation are the federal government’s people- its human 
capital. 
United States Government Accountability Office, July 2005. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many Marines are predisposed against the idea of performance based pay.96  
Although there are some legitimate concerns associated with the idea, much of the 
resistance, though cloaked with legitimacy, may be very personal at the roots of their 
opposition.  Human nature is generally resistant to change.  In an organization where the 
decision makers are the Marines with the most longevity, it would be counter intuitive for 
them to alter the system that rewarded the very behavior that put them into their place of 
influence.  It takes courage and intellectual objectivity to analyze the Marine Corps’ 
compensation system outside of one’s personal sphere.  To truly effect this change, all 
Marines must be convinced that performance pay is legitimate and good for the 
individual as well as for the Corps. 
This chapter touches on contemporary techniques for organizational change in 
general, followed by a recommendation made by the Government Accountability Office 
on modifying government compensation systems to include a component of merit or 
performance based pay.  It concludes with one suggested method to initiate and sustain 
performance pay in the Marine Corps.  This submission is by no means the way, but 
merely a demonstration that shows one of the ways. 
 
 
                                                 
96 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
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B. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Its human nature to resist change: when Marines say they oppose performance 
based pay, fear of the unknown and saving face are two compelling factors that may be 
the true heart of their concerns.  Any opponent of this idea must ask him or herself, “Is 
my opposition based on principle, practicality, or self?” 
Adding a component of performance based pay to the Marine Corps’ 
compensation system is not revolutionary in nature.  It would add value to an existing 
legitimate system as an improvement to a credible organization and methodology.  Many 
of the recognized techniques used to channel major organizational transformation into 
practice are not necessary to implement this valuable change.  But a focused effort will be 
required to prevent the change from failing due to subversive resistance or simple 
oversight. 
The Marine Corps, though dedicated to its traditions, prides itself on the ability to 
adapt to changing conditions.  In today’s society, people are placing more and more 
emphasis on being compensated for individual effort and achievement.  Though Marines 
differentiate themselves from the civilian sector – for survival and success – the Corps 
must adapt elements of society that will not threaten but will enhance its own culture.  To 
achieve an effective “first order change”97 in the Marine Corps, a thorough analysis 
involving all stakeholders would be required to maximize buy-in from all parties 
involved.  The change must be collective, suitable for the Marine Corps, implemented 
over time, and an evolution rather than an abrupt change.98
Though not a second order change, the scope of this change could be far reaching.  
Not only could performance pay improve the individual contribution of career Marines, it 
could be a catalyst for improvements in the fitness report system, counseling system, and 
pay for all DoD members.  These will be considered in the final parts of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
97 Bartunek and Franzak, 580, 1988. (A first order change is not transformational in nature.  A 
“second-order change” would be a major revision that in some way would reinvent the Marine Corps, 
whereas a first order change is simply adding value.) 
98 McShane and Von Glinow, 514, 2003. 
  65
                                                
C. COMPONENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Kurt Lewin, a social psychologist, developed “force field analysis” models to 
describe how the organizational change process works. 99  On the simplest level, a 
change is propelled toward the desired state by driving forces and repelled by restraining 
forces.  In Lewin’s philosophy, to implement change effectively, the initiator of change 
must “unfreeze” the status quo, make the change, then “refreeze” the organization in its 
altered state.  This technique is oriented on changes that are revolutionary in nature.  The 
addition of pay-for-performance is really more of an evolutionary change, and would not 
require the same concerted effort an organization-wide second order change might 
necessitate.  But it would be useful to apply lessons and techniques from Lewin’s analogy 
to ensure this proposed evolution is well-accepted and lasting in nature.  
The remainder of Section C will act as a “primer” of sorts by presenting some of 
Dr. Lewin’s key elements of change from the third edition of McShane-Von Glinow’s 
textbook Organizational Behavior.  Restraining forces are actions or conditions that 
stand in the way of progressing toward the desired change.  Driving forces, on the other 
hand, are influences that support change.  In order for the driving forces to prevail over 
the opposition, steps must be taken to reduce the resistance.100  
Employee resistance is the most frequent barrier to change.101  Due to justified 
and unjustified fears, many employees will take direct and indirect actions intended to 
thwart the movements of change.  These fears can be so deep seeded that an employee 
might not even consciously be aware that he or she is trying to subvert change while they 
are actually engaged in deliberate efforts of resistance.  In addition to the fear of the 
unknown, employees may also resist change because they are uncomfortable with 
changes to their routine or familiar circumstances.  Finally, some members of an 
organization may resist change because they fear having a new light shed on their 
professional reputations; he or she may want to “save face.” 
 




                                                
Another barrier to change is the perceived and the real costs that will be incurred 
by the individual and by the changing institution.  These costs must be identified and 
incorporated into the overall change plan to reduce their affect on a transition.  The 
financial cost of initiating and maintaining change, combined with the benefit of an 
intended change, must have an increased net present value to the organization over the 
status quo.  To gain and retain the individual’s support, increased personal costs to 
change must be offset by a greater benefit. 
When an organization decides to make a change, the driving forces largely 
determine whether the change succeeds or not.   Employees, particularly in leadership 
roles, must be focused on a clear, well-articulated vision of the desired end state.  
Furthermore, all involved stakeholders must be imbued with a sense of urgency, so that 
the change maintains momentum and does not suffer from protracted implementation.  
Finally, one particularly effective technique to keep everyone’s “eye on the ball” is to 
implement a pilot program in a small representative group and then use its successes to 
motivate the remainder of the organization – this is also called a diffusion program.102
How do the leaders, the driving forces, reduce the resistance?  Cooperative 
measures should be initiated to help stakeholders understand the organization’s objectives 
and to achieve buy-in.  Communication is key for alleviating stakeholders’ concerns.  
Since a large part of resistance is often due to ignorance, communication through training 
can be a very effective method to reduce anxiety, educate, and motivate individuals 
toward a vision for change.  One of the discussed barriers to change is the reluctance to 
change routines.  This can be characterized as a component of stress management.  To 
reduce stress, stakeholders should be encouraged to discuss their concerns at work and at 
home – forums or outlets for this discussion should also be encouraged - these can take 
on many forms.  Focus groups, Internet bulletin boards, question and answer cards, 
frequently asked question postings, classes, and the aforementioned training could all 
work together to reduce stress.   
 
102 McShane and Von Glinow, 515, 2003. 
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If the cooperative techniques are not successful, an organization that is dedicated 
to invoking change can implement stronger methods to reduce the resistance.  Two of 
these techniques are Negotiation and Coercion.  Negotiation is a natural progression 
beyond efforts to educate and communicate that should be held in reserve for only 
stalwart and influential opponents.  Coercion may have limited success, but most 
individuals to do not perform to their potential when their heart is not committed to their 
cause. 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 
The United States Government Accountability Office hosted a symposium on 
managing “Performance-Oriented Pay Systems” in July of 2005.  The GAO convened 
this symposium because they recognize that people are the government’s greatest 
resource, yet the government “has not transformed, in many cases, how it classifies, 
compensates, develops, and motivates its employees to achieve maximum results within 
available resources.”103  One question the GAO poses is how can the government update 
its compensation to be more “market based and performance oriented?”104
In their report on implementing performance-oriented pay systems, the GAO said 
it is both “doable and desirable.”105  The participants outlined seven objectives they deem 
critical to achieving success in this potential organizational change.  Not surprisingly, 
these objectives are very similar to Lewin’s ideas on implementing, enacting, and 
sustaining organizational change. 
• Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system. 
• Examine the value of employee’s total compensation to remain 
competitive in the market. 
• Build safeguards to enhance the transparency and ensure the fairness of 
pay decisions. 
 
103 GAO Symposium on Performance Oriented Pay, 1, July 2005. 
104 Ibid, 12. 
105 Ibid, Highlights. 
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• Devolve decision making on pay to appropriate levels. 
• Provide training on leadership, management, and interpersonal skills to 
facilitate effective communication. 
• Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms. 
• Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system. 
The GAO’s comprehensive report thoroughly develops each of these objectives 
into a healthy discussion of implementation in the government.  They ably demonstrate 
the viability of this idea and describe how each objective could be enacted.  The report 
also mentions that individual expectations must be aligned with organizational results, 
and that individuals and organizations must recognize that pay increases are no longer an 
entitlement, but based on an employee’s contribution to the organization’s mission and 
goals. 
For purposes of discussion, the tenets from the GAO report for implementing 
performance pay in the government have been used to design one suggested approach to 
putting performance pay into practice in the Marine Corps.  There are a number of 
frameworks for implementing change that could be considered before pursuing this goal.  
John Kotter and Peter Senge106 are two contemporary “change” experts whose work 
should be consulted before embarking on a project of this magnitude.   The GAO’s tenets 
closely resemble Kotter’s tenets for change;107 since they have already been shaped to fit 
a governmental organization, they are a good fit for an exemplary discussion. 
 
E. IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE PAY IN THE CORPS 
The Marine Corps has some very effective methods of performance based 
recognition.  Though some are cynical about personal awards, most recipients appreciate 
them and the associated recognition.108  FITREP based promotions in rank, though 
designed to award greater responsibility to the best candidates, rewards performance, but 
                                                 
106 Coutts, June 2000, [http://www.telusplanet.net/public/pdcoutts/leadership/Kotter.htm], last viewed 
November 2005. 
107 Ibid. 
108 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
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there is often a significant lag time between exemplary performance and increased pay 
from a promotion.  Plus, there is no range for relative compensation – a Marine either 
gets promoted or he does do not.  Most Marines regard increased responsibility/authority 
as a reward.  This is generally very effective, and would be enhanced by rewarding the 
superior performers for their efforts.  Oftentimes, Permanent Change of Station orders 
reflect a Marine’s reputation and standing from his/her chain of command: this can be a 
reward as well, but it is far from systematic and not a priority.  There are many ways the 
Corps rewards superior performance; but there is still notable performance that goes 
unrecognized, and many of the attempts to recognize or reward performance do not have 
the desired effects on the intended recipients. 
Performance based pay rewards in the Corps will not effectively motivate all 
Marines; the survey shows that many say they would not be affected by it at all.  Plus, 
there are many who simply cannot work any harder, and there are a few who just will not 
work any harder, regardless of the incentive.  For many Marines (some of whom may not 
admit it), though, pay-for-performance will increase their utility and value to the Corps, 
particularly when the other incentives are not timely or available.  For the many 
dedicated Marines who are already operating at 100 percent capacity, a performance 
based bonus could be an “atta-boy” for their outstanding efforts.  The individual Marine 
may or may not appreciate her bonus in a cognitive sense, but subconsciously, he or she 
will feel that one’s efforts are recognized (and it will be a nice reward to bring home 
extra pay in exchange for the additional effort so many Marines put forth).  It is hard to 
assign a value or a utility to the quality of feeling appreciated, but if this quotient is 
increased, the likelihood of keeping the Corps’ best Marines and best families will be 
improved.  The GAO’s tenets for change discussed in the latter section, are used to frame 
one suggestion implementing change for performance based pay in the Marine Corps. 
 
“Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system.” 
 
The Marine Corps’ Core Values are “Honor, Courage, and Commitment.”  If 
Marines are paid for their performance, that performance must be oriented on the 
execution of duties that reflect core values.  In turn, the yardstick for Marines’ 
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performance, the FITREP (discussed in Chapter II) needs to reflect the core values in its 
measurement of performance.  Pay resulting from one’s fitness report that is linked to a 
Marine’s performance measured by standards that reflects the Corps’ values creates a 
system of incentives that will compel Marines to focus their actions on the Corps’ best 
interest.  The alternative is individual performance focused on differing agendas with 
other values attached.  
 
“Examine the value of employee’s total compensation to remain 
competitive in the market.” 
 
The Marine Corps, and the U.S. Military alike, has a pretty comprehensive 
compensation package.  In the early 1990s, it was determined that there was a significant 
“pay-gap” between military members and their “civilian equivalents.”109 The current 
presidential administration set out to correct that perceived gap through pay raises from 
2001 until 2006 that were designed to outpace inflation.  At the time of this writing, it is 
not known whether the “pay gap” (as it had been defined) has been rectified or not.   
Other facets of pay, like S&I, have been already discussed in this paper.  The 
military has comprehensive geographic adjustment criteria for high cost living areas 
called Cost Of Living Allocation (COLA), and Marines receive additional pay for 
additional years of service, which was also discussed in Chapter II. The Marine Corps has 
a pretty inclusive total compensation package with one significant deficiency: there is no 
pay that is tied to directly to a Marine’s performance. 
 
“Build Safeguards to enhance the transparency and 
ensure the fairness of pay decisions.” 
 
The Marine Corps FITREP system has a number of safeguards in place due to its 
almost exclusive influence on promotions.  The previously discussed FITREP marking 
normalization process will promote fairness and protect Marines from maltreatment.  The 
 
109 9th QRMC, 70, 2001. (How do you compare civilian and military salaries?  A civilian truck 
mechanic and a Marine truck mechanic with comparative experience may make similar wages, but the 
civilian does not do his job under small arms fire – how do you pay someone for that component of their 
work?) 
  71
FITREPs marking, recording, and reporting is safeguarded through electronic transfer 
and duplicative checks and balances.   Another way to protect Marines and to continue 
enhancing communication and understanding would be to make pay-for-performance 
distribution information available on the Internet.  The Marine Corps is currently working 
to make FITREP distribution information available to the user, the effects of pay-for-
performance information could be an added page to that site.   
 
“Devolve decision making on pay to appropriate levels.” 
 
The GAO report suggests “first line managers propose pay increases”; “up-line 
managers ensure the assessments and justifications are consistent across groups.”110  This 
continues to add merit to the plan to link pay to the Marine Corps fitness report.  
Although the normalization and distribution of performance based pay would occur at the 
Headquarters Marine Corps level, the grading criteria would be assigned as the GAO 
symposium suggested: by the first two supervisors in a Marine’s chain of command. 
 
“Provide training on leadership, management, and interpersonal skills to facilitate 
effective communication.” 
 
If performance pay is to succeed in the Corps, it needs to be well understood and 
communicated.  Projected presentations given to audiences of thousands at a time will not 
accomplish this objective.  For effective promulgation, trainers must train other trainers 
through hands on activity to spread true appreciation and understanding.  Chapter III 
discusses how the seven-year-old FITREP is still called “the new FITREP.”  Seven years 
is too long to wait for Marines to get their arms around a pay-for-performance concept if 
it is implemented.  Focus groups and individual training will be critical to effectively 
communicating the pros and cons of this idea.  It is imperative that Marines who are 
reporting on and counseling their juniors on FITREPs completely understand the new 
system and pass their understanding down to the Marines they mentor.  
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“Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms.” 
 
The GAO symposium agrees that hosting lectures to train employees and 
representatives is not enough by itself.  Actions at these training events must be real and 
genuine in nature – they have to show good intent and accurately illustrate the benefits of 
adopting performance based pay.   
Likewise, the Marine Corps must work to overcome the cultural allegiance to the 
old system. One option would be to take on an aggressive marketing campaign to win the 
Marines’ “hearts and minds.”  The premise of the campaign is to saturate the limited (i.e., 
small) market through every official channel.  The message should be that performance 
pay will not take away a Marine’s Base Pay; it could be considered a reward for those 
who consistently demonstrate superior performance.  When Marines begin to experience 
the positive benefits of this pay system, they will spread the message through unofficial 
channels, at the grass-roots level.   
Additionally, leaders will be evaluated on the degree and success of their efforts 
to make it work.  The current FITREP includes grading criteria regarding the Marines’ 
efforts and abilities as a Reporting Senior – this will grade a Marine’s efforts at assigning 
marks that affect another’s pay to his own performance based compensation. 
The following are some suggestions for promoting performance based pay: 
• Utilize formal Marine message traffic. 
•  Conduct “Road Show” briefings by Marine Manpower to address 
audiences with a consistent brief. 
• Publish video messages and personal visits from senior Marine Corps 
leaders. 
• Host focus groups and question and answer sessions. 
• Train a cadre of trainers to conduct small unit on-site training. 
• Establish a Performance Pay support website that includes portions of the 




110 GAO Symposium on Performance Oriented Pay, 12, July 2005. 
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“Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system.” 
 
This is not a “fire and forget”111 modification to the Corps’ compensation system.  
The GAO’s report from their symposium on performance pay states:  
High performing organizations understand they need to continuously 
review and revise their performance management systems to achieve 
results and accelerate change… organizations should be open to refining 
their systems to address unintended consequences that may arise when 
implementing their pay systems.112   
The office assigned by HQMC to implement pay for performance must continue 
monitoring the system by seeking out objective feedback and data on its effectiveness 
and acceptance.  Further, the initial change is not the only inertia that must be 
overcome—careful consideration should be given to additional potential changes to 
maximize the effectiveness of a performance based pay.  The Marine Corps must be 
willing to make subsequent changes or adjustments to the pay system as the developing 
system requires while breaking ground on this unprecedented idea.  All parties involved 
need to understand that they must view this as a long-term project.  Just as it has taken 
years to establish normalized scales for fitness report Reporting Seniors, it will take time 
to normalize this value-added component of pay.  There will certainly be unintended 
consequences – these will be discussed in more detail in at the end of this section. 
This project will not attempt to map out the budgeting requirements to add 
performance pay to the Marine Corps’ compensation system, but will offer a few 
suggestions for further work.  Chapter III demonstrates that a greater utility will result if 
Marines are paid for performance – thus, the costs in relation to benefits will actually be 
less in the long run.  There will undoubtedly be start-up expenses associated with 
implementation that must be fully considered.  Studies, staffing, communication, training, 
and monitoring will all have a price.  One cost saving measure already incorporated into 
 
111 Unlike some weapon systems that must be tracked from the time they are fired until they impact 
the target, a “fire and forget” weapon tracks the target independently after it is launched.  As a 
colloquialism, a “fire and forget” program or Marine needs no additional guidance after receiving 
instructions. 
112 Human Capital, 21, June 2004. 
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the proposed system is the link to the PES: the performance measurement aspect is 
already funded and in place.  To add this “bonus” to base pay, consider this method:  
instead of continuing a 3½% inflation-based raise to base pay every year, reduce the cost 
of living increase by a point and redirect those funds into the performance based bonus 
account.  Depending on the quantity and average amount of performance based bonuses; 
it should take no more than a few years to shift the funding with no expenses added 
beyond administrative costs.  The bottom line on costs is this: this project does not show 
how to manage the costs, but costs should not be prohibitive and there are appropriate 
ways to pay for a performance bonus that will result in an increased performance to 
dollar ratio for manpower in the Corps.  
 
F. PERFORMANCE BASED PAY DOES NOT STAND ALONE 
Performance based pay will only be one part of the Total Compensation Package 
– “people come to work for and stay with the federal government for a variety of reasons 
besides base pay.”113  Marines desire informal recognition, discipline, and service to their 
country/Corps.  While most are focused on selfless service, they appreciate their awards 
when they get them.114  They seek promotion as recognition and for the promise of 
continued service it portends.  It must be emphasized and understood that adding a pay 
benefit for performance does not supplant the Corps’ irreplaceable culture.  If this 
balance cannot be imbued in Marines as part of the change, then either performance pay 
or the Corps will fail.  The Marine Corps cannot lose its identity over what really 
represents a minor change. 
Although no change should infringe on the Corps’ irreplaceable culture and 
traditions, there are some associated facets that will inevitably evolve with the 
development of performance pay.  Since performance pay would be linked to the PES, 
and likewise to FITREPs, counseling and to leadership; all will be refined as their linkage 
becomes more succinctly evident.  Figure 7 illustrates this relationship 
                                                 
113 Human Capital, 10, June 2004. 
114 NPS Marine Officer Survey 
    
 
Figure 7.   Marine Corps Relationships Illustration 
 
Implementing pay for performance could be part of a greater continuing Corps’ 
Improvement.  With this change, a simultaneous FITREP evolution to reflect strategic 
values, an improved counseling system, and better focus and agreement on the 
expectations of Marines in general can also occur.  Negative initial responses to 
performance pay likely stem from fear or a lack of confidence in the USMC FITREP, 
indicating two conditions: the FITREP is still considered new and many do not 
understand its “normalizing” characteristics. The lack of confidence in the FITREP may 
also show that revitalizing the understanding and use of the FITREP is one of the first 
steps to realizing a powerful improvement in the performance/ evaluation/ compensation 
arena.  
 
G. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
There are potential unintended effects that could result from implementing 
performance based pay in the Marine Corps.  Many Marines may feel that the cultural 
roots of what makes the Corps special are threatened.115  The Corps should not give up or 
de-emphasize what it has: esprit de corps, common values, discipline, etc.  But it must 
recognize that though many Marines have an uncommon amount of stated and true 
idealism, there are many who have only some, and a few (who make above average 
                                                 
115 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
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contributions) who have very little.  Some of these Marines need real fiduciary 
recognition to get their full attention and maximum output. The components of an 
organization are not a zero sum game.  When done properly, this change can add value 
without sacrificing the Corps’ values.   
Some may believe that performance pay is needed in other organizations, but that 
the Marine Corps is above “paying off” its Marines.  One officer at Head Quarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC) flatly rejected the concept as if it were blasphemy, despite stating 
that the other services are exploring the performance pay initiatives.  It is arrogant to 
believe that the Corps does not have room for improvement or cannot incorporate 
obvious valuable lessons from society and the other services.   
The Corps has great Marines.  But how many great Marines are now civilians 
because they felt unappreciated or unrewarded?  True, the Corps might rather have a 
Marine who serves purely for idealistic reasons, but is it honestly a reality to believe that 
every valuable Marine performs in this manner?  At some point, pay becomes important 
to all Marines.  Consider the example of the good performing Marines who would have 
stayed in with better recognition who chose to get out while social loafers stayed in.  
Would the Marine Corps rather have Marines stay for a full career who (selfishly?) 
wanted financial recognition or does the Corps prefer Marines who don’t pull their 
weight but accept “equitable pay”?  Although not the focus of this paper, retaining better 
Marines beyond their initial obligation could be one positive unintended effect of this 
suggested change. 
Some might argue that paying for better performance will lessen the individual’s 
altruistic contributions to the Corps.  It is imperative the individual Marine be honest with 
him or herself when evaluating the legitimacy of performance pay.  Marines are imbued 
with idealistic values, which may appear to be devalued by an acceptance of performance 
pay.  But the truth of the matter is that this organization has already acknowledged that 
pay matters, even to idealistic Marines.  This is reflected in the willing implementation 




                                                
and the commensurate increases in pay via the promotion process.   Performance pay 
does not cheapen a Marine’s contribution; it simply recognizes and rewards it in a more 
direct manner. 
Another argument against paying for performance might be that, over time, the 
nature of a typical career Marine could evolve from the perceived self-sacrificing, duty-
oriented Marine of today to an individual focused on pay over all other 
objectives/standards.  Although this may be far-fetched, it is one of the many reasons it 
will continue to be essential to preserve and promote the Corps’ valued culture.   
Another added benefit will be that performance pay helps keep Marines’ attention 
and efforts focused on the Corps.  Marines make individual economic choices every day 
– that’s the economy of their time, thoughts, effort, dreams, and priorities as well as their 
money.  Few Marines have no personal interests outside the Corps.  Most have hobbies or 
interests that consume an amount of their personal time and resources.  Among these, 
second jobs, investing activities and educational ventures frequently take time a Marine 
could be using to “invest” in the Marine Corps.  The choice to undertake these additional 
activities is one that draws a line between the additional productivity that an individual 
could contribute to the Marine Corps and the alternatives the Marine chooses because the 
alternative has greater value to him or her.  Performance Pay will make those alternatives 
seem less valuable and additional contributions to the Marine Corps more important to 
many Marines – benefiting the Corps. 
Many people interviewed for this project stated that an obvious reason to avoid 
performance based pay would be the competitiveness it would generate in units and the 
negative effect that would have on unit cohesion.  They argue FITREP based 
performance pay will create an element of competition that will degrade unit cohesion.116  
If this were the case, then merit-based promotions have the same effect because pay and 
promotions are intrinsically linked in today’s Marine Corps.  The Corps accepts the risk 
that promotion pay inflicts on unit integrity.  Adding a small (10%) element of 
performance based compensation to that equation would be no different. 
 
116 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
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Another common fear Marines voice is that tying pay to one’s FITREP would be 
unfair because it does not accurately reflect an individual’s performance or legitimate 
potential.117  If that is the case, then the Corps must be promoting the wrong people as 
well, a conclusion with far greater ramifications than the consideration of performance 
pay.  If the PES does not work, the Corps’ best leaders have been forced out or are stalled 
in the middle ranks.  The authors do not support this conclusion; they believe that though 
some reports are inaccurate, FITREPs average out over time to show one’s relative 
current and future value to the Corps.  Though one’s performance pay may be off 
periodically, it too would average out over time.  If the FITREP program does not reflect 
performance, that problem must be rectified whether performance based pay is 
implemented or not.  
Performance bonuses may increase Marine spouses’ appreciation for their 
husband/wife’s work as well as their allegiance to the Corps.  While most Marines work 
hard out of allegiance to their unit and Corps, money is a universal measurement.  If a 
Marine comes home and tells his spouse he got a “great FITREP,” what does that really 
mean to a spouse?  If he or she brings home his Leave and Earning Statement (LES) and 
says, “Remember that great FITREP I got?  We’re getting a 10% bonus for the next 
year!” that affects how they both feel about the Corps.  Pay for performance could 
increase allegiance and loyalty. 
The Corps must look at itself introspectively and recognize that it is stuck with 
some people who have low idealism and low productivity.  It is nice to say “we need to 
get rid of those people,”118 but in reality, many are “tenured” until retirement and little 
can be done with today’s incentives to affect their performance.  An element of 
performance based pay may be the tool that energizes these individuals to perform at the 
level that got them on the “tenure track” to begin with.  By keeping more superior 
performers, the Corps will have to deal with fewer “free-riders”. 
 
 
117 NPS Marine Officer Survey. 
118 Ibid. 
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The appropriate application of a performance based pay has tremendous potential 
to improve the Marine Corp’s performance.  One key to this application is a successful 
bid to achieve buy-in from all Marines.  The GAO created a sound course of action that 
has direct applicability to the Marine Corps – this was exemplified to some degree in this 
section.  Though not a revolutionary change/ second order change, successfully 
implementing performance based pay in the Corps will be an all hands effort.  It must be 
communicated through all available mediums in a give and take manner, then moderated 
over time to ensure the continuum of change.  There are a number of known and 
unknown detriments to this idea.  Careful consideration, planning, and execution will 
alleviate most of the legitimate concerns, and overall, the value to the Corps will 


























The Marine Corps is respected around the world for its strength, professionalism, 
and ability to emerge victorious from myriad missions.  Revered for it camaraderie and 
esprit de corps across the ranks, as well Marines’ commitment to embrace the core values 
of Honor, Courage, and Commitment, some of the Corps’ greatest strengths are its  
adaptability and flexibility.  However, one area in which the Marine Corps has not 
adapted to meet a changing environment is its compensation system.   
The USMC’s promotion process, the most universal method of rewarding strong 
performance, does not motivate Marines to perform at an “above average” level.  Except 
for in the lowest ranks, early promotion is not a viable option.  When promotions do 
occur, they are based more on the potential for future service than they are on rewarding 
the performance that may have occurred years before.  Furthermore, a majority of 
officers and staff non-commissioned officers are selected to retirement eligible ranks on 
the basis of survival in the system; the promotion rates to the retirement eligible ranks of 
Staff Sergeant and Major reward longevity, not performance.  One of the Marine Corps’ 
leadership principles is to “Seek Self Improvement”; performance pay represents one 
avenue the Corps can take to do this.  It can send the right signal to Marines by rewarding 
superior performance, thus increasing the likelihood of retaining the best Marines for 
future service.  Summaries of the two research questions posed at the project’s 
introduction follow. 
 
1. How Can the Marine Corps Include an Element of Performance 
Based Pay in Its Pay System?  
Research supports the notion that appropriately chosen and implemented 
incentives have a positive influence on individual and group performance.  As covered in 
Chapter II, this concept is being increasingly used in the private sector.  Among the many 
positive outcomes, proven results include increased productivity and a heightened sense 
of procedural justice within the organization.  The crux of the issue for implementing  
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such systems within large organizations is that individuals crave compensation security, 
yet they want recognition and differentiation to reflect their individual efforts.  
 Furthermore, as an organization considers the costs and benefits of utilizing one 
or more of the many variants of pay-for-performance, it must look inwardly to its own 
means of evaluating personnel performance, a critical link in compensating workers for 
their performance.  The Marine Corps employs a Personnel Evaluation System that is 
automated and centrally maintained by Manpower Management assets at Headquarters 
Marine Corps.  This system touts a normalized ranking process that simplifies the process 
of differentiating Marines by computing the weights of their evaluator’s marks relative to 
that evaluator’s grading history.   
Chapter III addressed multiple pay-for-performance schemes that surfaced as 
viable options for the Marine Corps.  At its conclusion, a performance based bonus was 
identified as the option that best captures the attributes such a system should aim to 
achieve equitability, effectiveness, and efficiency.  Under this system, fenced 
appropriation funds would be awarded to outstanding performers based on their ranking 
within their particular segment or cross-section, determined by MOS and rank.  Marines 
of the rank of Sergeant (E-5) and above would be eligible; evaluations for Corporals (E-
4) and below are not recorded on the FITREP.  For the purposes of this discussion, each 
reward will be worth 10% of a recipient’s annual basic pay, spread out over the course of 
the following year.  An illustrative Excel based optimization model demonstrates a means 
to distribute the merit bonus effectively, efficiently, and equitably using inputs from a 
survey taken on Marine officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School.  Among the 
many courses of action that may be implemented in the endeavor to reward deserving 
Marines with a performance based pay, the Marine Corps should consider breaking down 
the 10% blocks into a distribution scheme that awards 90% of eligible recipients between 





2. How Might the Corps Effectively Implement and Sustain this 
Financial and Cultural Shift? 
The GAO study on performance pay in the federal government outlined a 
comprehensive structure for implementing this type of system in a governmental 
organization.  This structure is a good framework for the Marine Corps to use in its own 
preparation to add this reward to its compensation system.  Particularly upon the 
introduction of the idea, many Marines will oppose performance based pay.  For some, 
their ideological opposition will be legitimate.  For others, their resistance may be 
disguised as higher principles when they are actually rooted with internal fears of 
insufficiency.   The Corps is renowned for its ability to adapt to changing environments.  
Marines must show their “can-do” spirit and muster the courage to trade some of the 
current pay systems’ security for an appropriate and timely pay component based on 
merit.   
Although this change is not a “transformation,” significant steps must be taken to 
show performance pay is for the good of the Corps.  To convince Marines, the driving 
forces behind performance pay must break down the resistance through a series of efforts 
similar to those from the GAO’s proposed plan.  Performance pay must be linked to the 
Marine Corps’ core values, and it must be awarded based on inputs from candidate’s 
immediate supervisors.  To trust the system, Marines will need assurance that safeguards 
are in place to protect them from abuse; this trust can be built through overlapping efforts 
to achieve two-way communication and education on this issue.  Finally, to achieve 
lasting success, the performance pay system needs to be actively monitored and improved 
with continuing improvements as it develops and becomes better understood.   
Pay for performance will not stand alone.  Adding this FITREP based component 
to USMC pay will have inevitable effects on leadership, counseling, the PES process, as 
well as performance across the organization.  If this aspect of the change is accepted and 
managed smartly, performance pay will be a catalyst for improvement in all these areas. 
There will be unintended consequences as well.  Though some will be beneficial, 
the Marine Corps should concern itself with the possible negative effects this change 
could induce.  Some may argue that emphasis on rewarding individual effort will initiate 
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a cultural shift from one of teamwork to one of self-promotion.  Since 1775, Marines 
have proudly preserved their traditions and imbued new Marines with them for the good 
of the present and future Corps.  In a society becoming more and more focused on self 
rather than self-sacrifice, it has never been more important to continue developing one of 
the Corps’ greatest strengths: its heritage of discipline and esprit de corps.  These values 
will not be supplanted by performance pay nor any other minor changes to the Corps’ 
manpower management tools – the Corps’ roots run far too deep. 
 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The analyses conducted in support of this project were limited in many ways.  As 
appropriate, the weaknesses in the research were identified throughout the project. 
The NPS survey conducted in support of this project was extremely useful in 
gauging the initial opinions of 150 Marines on the topic of performance pay in the 
Marine Corps.  However, while this survey did span multiple MOSs and four ranks, the 
fact that it was taken exclusively on officers who are graduate students limits its 
perspective.   
Significant discussion was dedicated to the USMC FITREP.  After almost seven 
years of usage, this system is relatively new by Marine Corps standards and still not fully 
understood.  Research is constantly being conducted on the effectiveness of the USMC 
PES, particularly the heavily addressed grade-normalization aspects it employs.  For 
purposes of analysis, assumptions were made that the FITREP is a viable tool for 
measuring individual performance, and that it effectively aligns organizational and 
individual goals. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Recommendations to USMC leadership have been included throughout this paper.  
The authors’ suggestion is that the Marine Corps has an opportunity to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of its compensation system by incorporating some  
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elements of performance pay.  Explicit recommendations include the performance based 
bonus as discussed in Chapter III and the tools for implementation identified in Chapter 
IV.  
Multiple topics of future study related to pay-for-performance for the Marine 
Corps have become evident throughout the course of this project.  These include: 
• Further analysis on the USMC FITREP for its effectiveness in linking 
individual Marine pay with performance 
• Development of other viable pay-for-performance schemes 
• Development of a legitimate means to measure utility across the various 
segments of the Corps 
• Analysis on the long-term effects of pay-for-performance on recruitment 
and retention 
• Creating more advanced decision models, to include Sensitivity and 
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1.  I work hard already -- don't think I can put in more time --  
2.  We are not the Air Force  
3.  wouldn't have to exert extra effort  
4.  As much as it would take to do my best at the job.  
5.  It would be an added incentive, but I have always tried to put everthing I have into what I do.  
6.  As hard as possible, without sacrificing family constraints, that already exist as a member of the military. Too difficult to put a 
percentage on how much extra effort I would exert just to gain.  
7.  Would work just as hard regardless of bonus as long as job was meaningful and worthwhile  
8.  above 10%  
9.  There is no amt of money that can justify whether or not to work as hard as possible in the business fo winning battles and protecting 
each other  
10.  100% effort is 100%...additional pay does not motivate those accustomed to doing their very best, always.  
11.  I don't think you can judge a % of effort for a % of pay. An incentive of a bonus wouldn't make me work any harder becuase I think 
it's our obligation to work hard regardless of the "compensation."  
12.  I can't answer this. It depends on how effort is measured. By time? By some performance metric?  
13.  If I based my career on pay, I would not be in the MC. I already work hard at my job because I like it and can live an adiquatly on the 
pay I receive. ask a new enlisted Marine  
14.  50  
15.  Maybe I have been in too long, but I don't see my effort in terms of monetary compensation... its a duty.  
16.  How can a measurement of extra effort be measured? This is a difficult metric. From my standpoint, I would be willing to work (this is 
a very rough estimate) @ 20 % harder to earn a 10% pay bonus.  
17.  Not sure how I could exert more effort. Based on ranking or what?  
18.  I feel like I am sufficiently compensated and the extra "work" would decrease time with family. Therefore, the time required to exert 
more effort is not worth 10% more pay.  
19.  Unknown - impossible to estimate  
20.  What kind of Marine you are should not be motivated by pay. Ideallistic, I know.  
21.  Difficult to categorize as myself and most other Marines try hard at everything we do.  
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1.  B and D  
2.  earlier selection rating  
3.  B & D  
4.  What about unit performance  
5.  Promotion  
6.  b & d  
7.  B & D  
8.  Their respect and recognition  
9.  Preference to duty station.  
10.  B & D  
11.  B & D  
12.  B & D  
13.  B & D  
14.  promotion  
15.  B & D  
16.  b&d  
17.  That "weak" performers would be actually held accountable and be forced out of the Marine Crops  
18.  promotion before those peers  
19.  faster promotions  
20.  "C" only. My hope is that the Fitness will report will speak for itself. Awards have been cheapened significantly. The possibility of a 
cash bonus is attractive.  
21.  more free time (ie 96)  
22.  B&D  
23.  B&D  
24.  Too subjective. The same good ole' boys that get the awards and high fitness reports would now get a cash bonus also.  
25.  oppourtuity at advancedpromotion  
26.  B & D  
27.  I do it for myself not for gain  



















1.  I don't think incentive pay will help. Just continue doing what we do, ranking the better Marines higher so they get promoted more -- 
that will increase their pay in the long run!  
2.  I would be very wary of linking direct monetary compensation to an immediate supervisor's evaluation. I've seen enough favoritism 
and office politics to understand the damage done with the system we have in place right now. I think adding pay issues to it would 
risk poisoning the workplace, and would inevitably disrupt the team.  
3.  As a leader, in the enlisted ranks, it seems more fiar that the performers get promoted, but in the officer corps, I feel that outstanding 
performance has nothing to do with promotion at least until the 0-5 level. It is all time based lineal number.  
4.  If a reporting senior knew that the fitness report he wrote would be a determining factor in any bonus calculation, it is probable that 
grade inflation would result.  
5.  USMC should be careful about what motivates our Marines. Right now, I believe we are doing well for motivation-- not even linked to 
the tangible benefits of an award or even pay. Most join the Marine Corps for the intangibles-- challenge and service-- both of which, I 
believe provide the motivation for performance and retention. Where those fall short, the USMC compensates in terms of bonuses (for 
retention purposes) and our basic pay.  
6.  I would get out if the Marine Corps turned into a indivivdual effort organization this is not why I joined. What happen to God, Country, 
Corps and doing you best everyday because it is the right thing to do.  
7.  Military professionalsism should not be equated with monetary compensation. Stick with pay changes with promotions -- but promote 
faster based on performance.  
8.  I think a performance based bonus would lead to more dishonest fitness reporting.  
9.  I think this pay system is more applicable to enlisted Marines rather than officers. I feel that Officer pay is sufficient, especially when 
compared to that of enslited Marines. All Marines, regardless of rank should be instilled with a sense of duty and appreciation for that 
duty by their seniors. Pay should not be the incentive for better performance. However, the enlisted pay system is lacking, therefore 
the incentive based pay could be beneficial to supplementing their income.  
10.  There are so many problems and inconsistencies with commander variance in fitness reports, awards, and other recognition that 
incorporating a financial incentive element could be poison to a unit. Marines tend to do what is asked of them, regardless of their pay 
- superior performers do more than that. Reenlistment bonuses are good financial incentives, and the command generally has a good 
idea of who they would like to stick around. For many, no amount of financial compensation will lead them to remain in the military. 
Awards, recognition, and superior fitness report marks should be the means to distinguish superior performance, not money. The 
current system is inconsistent enough.  
11.  Speaking for myself, pay was not a primary motivator to join the Marine Corps, it has unfortunately become the motivator to stay. 
There is a difference. The intangibles that come with being part of great institution are recompense enough for most but I would love 
to meet the Marine who would turn a bonus down if given the opportunity. At the end of the day, most Marines have bills to pay and 
families to support so I do think that pay for performance should be considered at the very least.  
12.  Direct financial compensation linked to the FITREP process is a serious mistake on the small unit level. Our system of awards, regular 
a& meritorious promotion is the vehicle to provide proper recognition and fiscal advancement to our Marines.  
13.  This is an interesting question. Performance evaluations are enormously subjective and if there were bonuses tied to performance they 
would need to be tied to concrete information like PFT or Marksmanship scores. I guess I am not sold on it because I have doubts 
about whether it can be fairly implemented.  
14.  1. It's tough to answer questions about my compensation when I'm being paid to get a free Master's degree. If I answered this 
question at my last duty station, I would have probably felt that I wasn't compensated enough. 2. I think that if the Marine Corps 
created some kind of performance based bonus system that it would be plagued with problems like inflated performance evaluations 
and loss of motivation by those Marines that didn't receive the bonus.  
15.  Marines are Marines precisely because they are not motivated by the almighty dollar. The very notion that you pay people more who 
perform "better" is absurd, and is a slippery slope to people perfomring well below expectations because they do not get this bonus. If 
a Marine is excelling at his job, then there are methods to reward such behavior that mean a whole lot more than a bigger paycheck. 
When I see a Cpl with a NAM on his chest, I know that this is a long ball hitter who goes above and beyond. I think the respect that 
goes along with that little green and orange ribbon goes miles farther than a few more dollars in pay.  
  105 
 
   106 
 
16.  We don't need a Corps of Mercenaries, but at the same time, it is demotivating to see sub-standard Marines making the same amount 
of money as the above-average Marines. I think another thing to look at is the "automatic" retirement once you reach a certain rank. 
A lot of Marines "drop their packs" once they reach that rank because they believe their retirement is in the bag. There is no 
incentative to continue to perform for fear of being let go after 17-18 years without benefits. Just something to think about.  
17.  I believe a Marine who is an electronic technician, should be given an additional bonus due to the complexity of his/her job...just like 
the pilots/docs/etc. He/She should rewarded, based upon their abilities versus a Marine who is in a less technical job. Same thing for 
Communications, Intelligence, or other short officer MOS's.  
18.  Despite moderately successful efforts to normalize fitness reports by grading the graders, fitness reports are still highly subjective and 
I can't envision a truly equitable way to adjust pay based on fitness reports.  
19.  Marines are motivated by awards, however, Marines become disgruntled when the awards are not assigned fairly. In order to motivate 
Marines the awards systems needs to be more standardized and fair.  
20.  The standards must be clearly defined so that negative perceptions are avoided from potential unfair evaluations.  
21.  Number 9 would not work because it is not a standard way to measure performance. Many RS RO's inflate their marks, making this an 
arbitrary and capricious measure of actual performance.  
22.  I did not join the Marines for the pay chart. I joined the Marines to be a Marine. Extra pay, bonuses and other compensations are nice 
to have, but it is not going to make my decision on whether I am going to stay in the Marine Coprs or not. I think the money could be 
better used in buying equipment or training.  
23.  Most Marines are not in the game for money or medals. When on deployment, you work as hard as you can to support the Marines 
fighting, that will not change for a cash bonus or peice of cloth.  
24.  Marines work hard because they are Marines.  
25.  Enduring above average performance can only be cultivated by the intangibles. Monetary incentives will only increase the incidence of 
sycophants and back-stabbers trying to position themselves for the money. It will increase the incentive for people to appear to be 
working harder without the incentive to actually benefit the Marine Corps and their Marines. Above average Marines perform because 
they are dedicated Marine professionals who believe in what they are doing. In its current state, the fitrep does not adequately 
capture performance because many officers do not take the time to track their averages and ensure that they are fairly breaking their 
Marines out. Furthermore, the promotion system seems to reward risk-averse individuals: if you just glide through with low effort but 
don't make any mistakes, you'll get promoted. Above average perfomance is not likely to get you promoted much faster, but a 
motivated Marine who takes a risk (whether in a operational or career decision) is likely to damage his promotion chances. This 
incentive structure needs to be changed. Above average performance should be more imporant than longevity and "zero defects" in 
promotion. The Air Force officers at NPS seem to know a lot about promotion and pay. It is all they talk about. One thing I found 
interesting was that they often mention people being rapidly promoted for stellar performance. I don't know of such stories in the 
Corps. Instead of pay incentives, I would ask: "Is stellar performace in the Corps rewarded by accelerated promotion? Should it be?"  
26.  I think cash will motivate those who are accustomed to watching the clock and punching out early. Top performers do it out of pride. 
Rewards are excellent incentives for people...but expecting more from those alread giving 110% may prove less than motivating to 
those who are already giving it their all.  
27.  I don't necessisarlily think there would be an unbiased, fair way to determine how much performance one Marine has over another. 
And the reason I suggest that is because the fitrep process is not always a clear indicaiton of which Marines are better at their job 
than others because it's all the perception of the individual writing the report and not that of the overall command. Everyone 
prioritizes performance traits and characteristics differently and I think this would be subject to inflation in the same way the current 
fitreps have become inflated in a lot of ways.  
28.  The fitrep system is already subject to graft. This is dangerous without better guidelines given to ROs, and monitering of their 
reporting, as there is money involved. An RO may be less likely to report accurately if he knows it means a Sergeant's family won't 
have that special Christmas.  
29.  Question 7 was a stumper because there is no way to quantify "extra effort" in most jobs especially when deployed. I'd say a majority 
of Marines put forth their best "effort" all the time.  
30.  Fitness report markings are too subjective to use as a benchmark for b onus pay. Pegging bonus pay to fitness report markings will 
simply hasten the infation of markings.  
31.  I don't think that performance based pay could be applied fairly simply based on normalized FITREPS. The demands of the billet is also 
a factor in determining required effort of Marines. MOS specific skill sets are also compensation considerations.  
32.  An incentive program which compensated Marines for performance would probably make it even harder to encourage Marines to take 
the "hard" jobs - like recruiting. Marines in these jobs place themselves at financial risk whereas Marines who request and receive 
"easy" jobs would be rewarded with cash bonuses.  
33.  The drawback is ensuring a bonus system is fairly implemented. Inspections/evaluations must be fair and avoid seniors playing politics 
with subordinates. This already happens with awards; if it begins to affect Marines' finances, it would be worse than not having a 
bonus system in place.  
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34.  This is arbitrary. Most things recommended to fix rely upon an unbiased senior either writing an accurate FitRep or an unbiased 
promotion selection ... in my experience this has never been the case. I do think that performance based pay will be abused. Seeing 
as how non-performers are still promoted suggests that we need only fix the system that is in place and actually promote performers 
over non-performers.  
35.  Pilots receive Flight Pay. Where do 0302's receive any bonus other than Combat Pay? At the end of a 20-year career, the adverse 
physical (and/or psychological) effects are more prevalent in Ground Combat MOS's than the other categories of USMC personnel. By 
the way, Question #7 is clearly looking at the marginal benefit of % pay vs. % effort. Can you really quanify effort? You need to 
define effort as something (e.g., longer hours, more deployments, more exercises, etc.).  
36.  Yes, I would work a little harder if given the above mentioned bonus option but I already work near my sanity threshold, so I'm not 
sure I could even be able to increase my efforts by any significant amount, trust me sanity is priceless. I disagree that the pay to 
performance incentive would apply to my paygrade since in my opinion this is not what the Marine Corps is supposed to be. The 
Marine Corps is a volunteer force, and for volunteering there are already incentives in place that emphasize the correct way to 
volunteer, such as hazardous duty pay and combat pay. Our most valued "enlisted Marines" are given retention bonuses, which is a 
sound principle in my opinion. If any one is under compensated it would be enlisted Marines, perhaps that is worth investigating more. 
37.  If you get an RO and/or RS who doesn't like you then you will get unfairly judged. I happens all the time. Thank goodness only awards 
are tied to such behaviors - not pay!  
38.  Its good to consider ideas out of the box, and I don't know the full scope of your project, but a commander adjusting pay is dangerous 
ground. We have all had superiors we don't get along with; keeping the finances out of those situations is good policy.  
39.  The following are just some of my thoughts on the pay/promotion system: 1. Nobody expects to become rich in the military nor 
should we. If it is strictly financial, we are but a bunch of mercenaries. History is rich with examples of superior mercenary forces 
being defeated by inferior forces that possess an intangible motivator. 2. Pay should reflect parity with the private sector (as best as 
possible) with compensation for combat duty (like we do currently). The military is not obligated beyond this. They could do a better 
job adjusting for cost of living. Unfortunately, this only works in large metropolitan areas were the military does not significantly 
determine economy (i.e. D.C., San Diego). In smaller economies, the cost of living will simple increase to as COLA does and re-
establish the current ratios at a higher rate. 3. You cannot draw a relationship between pay incentives (flight pay, re-enlistment 
bonuses, etc.) and performance bonuses. The former is a mechanism to ensure manpower availability and targets those areas where 
retention is problem for whatever reason. It would be interesting to see what would happen if we did away with these for a general 
increase in pay and full implementation of item (4). I would theorize that you would have a service of men and women that are in the 
military because they enjoyed the job as opposed to being bribed. You might have to increase initial obligations in some areas (i.e. 
aviation) in order to get a return on the initial investment. 4. Promotion should be used to recognize and motivate performance (this 
brings with it higher pay). The problem is that the average Joe can keep pace with a performer as long as he puts the checks in the 
right blocks. If we went to a system were commanders could promoted based on billet requirements and performance (regardless of 
time in grade), you would a see a break out of performers. Unfortunately, the current system says you will get promoted as long as 
you do not do something wrong and therefore there is less motivation to excel. Further, commanders are forced to fill empty billets 
with weaker leaders as they were not promoted based on their skills.  
40.  Fitness Reports are biased by the RS and fluctuate due to operational commitments along with garrison duties. How can you compare 
an outstanding Support MOS Marine to a Combat Arms Marine as far as outstanding performer?  
41.  My answers refer only to officer pay/promotions  
42.  Linking pay to fitness report results would only increase pressure for grade inflation. The only thing I dislike about the current pay and 
promotion system is the lack of competitiveness at junior ranks, moreso for officers. A strong Lance Corporal can work hard and be 
promoted to Corporal and Sergeant well ahead of his peers. SNCO promotions also seem more competitive. With target promotion 
rates of 99% to Captain and 80-90% to Major and the lack of below zone selections, a strong Lieutenant can work hard and watch a 
slacker advance with him in pay and rank for the majority of their careers. Most good officers aren't that motivated by money and 
rank but it would be nice to see a very small minority (1-2% maybe) receive early promotions (and with it the pay) now and then.  
43.  The risk of financial incentives is that money may supercede service and mission accomplishment as a primary motivator. I'm not 
optimistic that the USMC will implement financial incentives. I would like the USMC to consider the possibility of meritorious, 
accelerated, or early promotions to deserving officers--if and only if they are ready to assume the next rank.  
44.  Cash Bonuses based on competitiveness can breed more advesarial relationships than those that already exist. Bonuses based on 
individual effort (ie PT, Marksmanship, PME completion,m etc) would motivate Marines w/o the complication of subjective competition 
with others. Problem is this: no matter how modest or honorable we are, we are, for the most part, highly competitive type A 
individuals who take our performance assessments personnally. A subjectively-awarded cash bonus might cloud the air between 
teammates. Instead of attaching a cash bonus to a SUBJECTIVE measure (RS/RO Marks), attach it to an OBJECTIVE measure - PFT, 
Marksmanship, PME completion and so on. I still think fitness reports and personal pride should take care of all this. But if there will 
be additional compensation for giving 100 percent (your job anyway), then I think that Objective measures might be the way to go. I 
also disagree with pilots receiving large sums of money on top of their flight pay to keep them in. Sends a bad msg to us ground 
bubbas. I do, on the other hand, understand the financial reasoning. Rank for compensation - not really adequete - too many get 
promoted to make promotion a carrot. When you are promoting 95 percent to Capt, one can slide and still get promoted. When you 
are promoting in the 80s for Major, same same. Awards for compensation - NO, too many awards given out cheapens the value of the 
award, look at the Army. There are plenty of stellar performers, but they don't all rate medals because of it. A small portion definitely 
do. Contact info Capt Veath -- beveath@nps.edu  
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45.  By maintaining high standards, the Marine Corps could weed out those that do not belong here. It is far too easy for commanders at 
the lower levels to "keep the peace" and take the easy road when it comes to holding Marines accountable. Reasons for weak 
leadership range from promotion anxiety to political correctness anxiety. The performers will perform no matter what. The slackers 
will slack, no matter what.  
46.  Question 9 is a tough one because the fitrep is so subjective anyway. The liking and buy-in factors are huge particularly at the field 
grade level for favorable reports. On a separate thought, they should offer meritorious promotion systems for officers like enlisted to 
promote the best early and often. That in itself is a monetary reward.  
47.  I would need more information regarding how that performance is measured. In theory it sounds like a good idea. I'm just weary of 
how it could be implemented without affecting the morale of the average Marine.  
48.  The current accounting system of the federal goverment is already a large waste of resources. To complicate matters even further will 
result is a more complicated mess. Just as we do not have collar insignia to say we as a particular MOS are special, a pay system that 
would reflect that will simply result in a similar environment. A system that rewards short MOSs would also be a problem. It is better 
to have less officers when compared to lesser officers. Nobody joins the military or stays in the military for the sake of financial 
comphensation with the exception of those that look toward the retirement, but certainly not the annual salary.  
49.  Fitness Reports are too subjective a metric to fully encapsulate the performance of Marines. Undefinable characteristics of 
"Leadership", "Well Being of Subordinates" etc are left to the individual standards of the RS. Careful consideration of the metrics used 
for a pay based incetive system is required due to the very subjective nature of the Marine Corps current evaluation system.  
50.  A compensatory system in the Marine Corps would detriment unit cohesion and generally be geared to the higher ranking personnel. 
The system to address performance pay would generally fall on the CO's, who would only permit incentives based on visibility and not 
necessarily performance.  
51.  A small award bonus would eventually serve to promote individualism and not focus on leadership and teamwork. This would steer 
towards having the individuals trying to ensure they look better than their peers not necessarily actually performing better.  
52.  I've considered this topic only casually. Bonuses would have to be based on some complex formula, and not tied directly to the FitRep; 
otherwise the same issues that come up w/ FitReps will just be exacerbated if a bonus system is attached to them. Good luck....  
53.  The Marine Corps is already very competitive and in my oppinion we are diluted with great performers. Bringing money into the 
equation will make things worse.  
54.  I think that the negative effects of a performance-based pay system (jealousy among the ranks, abuse of the system by decision-
makers, metamorphasis of the system into a blanket bonus pay--like many civilian gov't organizations, etc.) would outweight the 
benefits (ie: incentive to perform). Additionally, the majority of the career Marines don't join for the pay benefits and thus the 
foundation of performance is character and personality based.  
55.  Medals are fair compensation, but the process is flawed and results in unequal distribution of awards when compared to the 
accomplishments. An example would be the driver of a VIP receiving a NAM while a MT mechanic gets nothing for working 24/7 to 
keep equipment running in a combat zone. All too often, I hear "the Marine was just doing his job" and while in some cases that may 
be true, in most cases it clearly is not. OIC's know when a Marine is going above and beyond, so why question them? Because they 
can not give a medal to everybody that deserves one - in the case of Marines, there would be too many. So where is the line drawn? 
Who's in charge of it? The General whose driver gets and award, or the 1stLt in a combat zone that just nominated a hard working MT 
mech for a job well done?  
56.  Implementing a truly fair system would be a challenge. However, I feel that some type of incentive based pay could help some 
individuals who feel that the promotion system does not allow them adequate reward for higher performance. No matter how hard you 
work, you cannot get promoted above the lower performing individual who got commissioned the week before you. Obviously there is 
some agreement that targeted pay benefits the Marine Corps, but currently only certain skill sets (aviators, lawyers) are rewarded. 
This is certainly a large factor in why I intend to retire at the earliest opportunity rather than stay until 30 years. I hope to find a 
second career that rewards performance in addition to loyalty.  
57.  This is a tough one. Pay does motivate. That is proven in the civilian world. However I don't know if money is the answer for morale 
and retention. People are drawn to the Corps more for autruistic reasons but leave because those reasons are not met. Extra pay 
would help but it would not be a more encompassing solution.  
58.  The part of question 6 reading "I would be more likely to stay in the Marine Corps if part of my pay was linked to my performance." is 
a very poorly worded question.  
59.  Instead of rewarding the top performers, the Marine Corps needs to do a better job of getting rid of the bad performers. It's easier to 
recognize someone who is truly a poor performer. The Corps has a bad habit of giving all of the work to the top performers, which 
causes many of them to get burnt out. Meanwhile, the poor performer gets to continue to slide, is happy with his life, and stays in. 
Then when it comes time for promotion, the top performer is burnt out and separates while the poor performer stays in and gets 
promoted. You should focus more on the poor performers, once they are gone, everyone will work harder because the people around 
them would be better.  
60.  This is a sensitive area. We are in the Marines to be Marines but for over the last 18 years I've seen many substandard performers go 
as well as everyone else. A system needs to be altered or created to deal with these types of Marines.  
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61.  Marines, over a long period of time, will work towards the standard. If the new standard included a reward system for 10% more 
effort, than that 110% would become the new 100% effort. Interestingly enough, that would quite possibly have a positive effect on 
output.  
62.  I did not enter the Marines for the paycheck. This survey is of NO usefulness. Asking Marines to perform "above average" compared to 
others for a few dollars more is an insult.  
63.  My question is how would the "superior performers" be evaluated? Part of the reason the military has a flawed individual award and 
inflated (when it is convenient) fitness report system is because of the subjectivity. You could be a well below average performer and 
get awards and high fitness report marks because "people like you".  
64.  An annual bonus would motivate the scammers to work the system to ensure they got that bonus.  
65.  I believe the way to reward performance is with appropriate Fitnes Reports and awards. Period.  
66.  Pay incentives are great, however I feel that they would more than likely contribute to an initial lowering of Moral when first instituted. 
After the Corps adjusted to the idea I beleive the impact on moral would decrease as it was looked at less as a discriminator and more 
as a part of the system. The other part of it, is who determines performance? This could open up a slew of fraternization issues and 
favortisism that isn't delt with as much on Pro/Cons and it would be when money is involved. Hope this info helps.  
67.  Although I know there are performance based cash awards in other government settings and jobs, I don't think it would be 
appropriate in the USMC. If you are in the USMC for the pay you are in it for the wrong reasons.  
68.  If the USMC became more of a meritocricy, it would have a better chance of retaining high performers.  
69.  I agree with number 9 to the extent that bonuses would increase overall performance across the board, but I disagree with using the 
fitness report as a benchmark. Possibly unit level bonuses should be used versus marine corps wide...  
70.  While additional monetary compensation would be nice, I don't think it would be a factor in performance. Civilians have had the 
monetary compensation program for years, and from my perspective, the ones that care about the job and do good work aren't 
thinking about "how much their going to be compensated at the end of the year".  
71.  Bonuses for Marines would evolve into the same system as we have for our civilians - they would be viewed more as an entitlement 
than an award for superior performance. Plus, if we can't satisfy our Marines with a basic standard for awards, then we would have 
even greater morale issues if it involves cash payments. Overall, it's a bad idea.  
72.  This is a tough survey. I just came off of a tour at HQMC. I saw civilians getting up to 50K cash awards for performance based annual 
"additional" compensation. I additionally saw Marines work their butts off, and the best they could hope for is a fair shake in the next 
promotion board. Conversely, I saw Marines that did enough to get by and get similar marks on their fitness reports because they had 
great personalities and the RS/RO like them. I could go on and on about pay incentives and fitness reports because I am an Ajutant 
and have seen both the good and the bad. Now, on the flip side to this, I have gotten out and worked in the civilian sector as well and 
have recorded for the Colonel's board two years ago and have to say that the Marine Corps is an incredibly fair and equitable 
"company." Some of the questions outlined above pose a dicotomy as Marines should try to do their best whenever they can as that is 
what makes us Marines. To do otherwise means you should just resign and go find employment elsewhere. However, I think only a 
liar would say that being financially rewarded for hard work and superior performance would be turned down. When the welfare of 
your family is on the line, money makes things happen, like kids going to college, affordable housing in high income areas (Wash DC) 
etc. If you would like to chat more about this, especially what I saw in the GS/SES arena in DC for three years, please let me know. 
Semper Fi, Capt J. M. Robinson, USMC jmrobins@nps.edu  
73.  (1) Money should not be the primary motivation for Marines to perform better. If it is, get out of the Marine Corps and find a job. A 
Marines motivation should be the need to be better, to always learn and grow. (2) Personal awards have lost their value as they are 
given to easily. In fact, end of tour awards are expected for some billets. (3) The Marine Corps should view pay as: (a) Can people 
make a living being a Marine (b) Are the salaries competitive enough to attract and keep talented people in the Marine Corps.  
74.  One of the questions above is doctrinally incorrect: "I feel that promotions are an adequate reward for performance." Promotions have 
never been about past performance. Officers are promoted based upon their potential to do the job at the next higher rank.  
75.  I really do believe it is a career not a job. Many of us could be making more money in the civilian world, yet we choose to stay. I really 
dont think money is a motivator. From my experience through the enlisted ranks and now as a field grade, money has never been the 
motivator. The only thing more money would do is encourage substandard performers to hang around longer. I think most Marines 
who have the discipline to live within their means can live comfortably within the current pay structure. I am not "anti-money" and I 
would never return a pay raise. However, I would not leave because I didnt get an increase in pay.  











GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV
# Bonuses Offered (d.v.) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 1.0 10.3 2.0 1.8 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.3
Total Marines 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 10 62 14 18 6 14 2 16
Segment Effect 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.47% 1.06% 0.26% 0.32% 0.22% 0.00% 0.13%
Segment % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% 0.0% 6.7% 41.3% 9.3% 12.0% 4.0% 9.3% 1.3% 10.7%
Segment Utility Factors 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.063 1.000 1.000 1.019 1.028 1.074 1.026 1.041 1.028 1.000 1.017
Money Summation 2812 2812 2812 2812 3690 3690 3690 3690 5002 5002 5002 5002 6381 6381 6381 6381
Pay Increments        O1 2812 2812 2812 2812
O2 3690 3690 3690 3690
O3 5002 5002 5002 5002
O4 6381 6381 6381 6381
O5
O6
GCA Max 2812 3690 5002 6381
GS Max 2812 3690 5002 6381
AVS Max 2812 3690 5002 6381



























O1 $2,344 $28,123 $2,812
O2 $3,075 $36,896 $3,690
O3 $4,168 $50,018 $5,002
O4 $5,318 $63,810 $6,381
O5 $6,431 $77,173 $7,717
O6 $7,763 $93,161 $9,316
GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV
O1 0 0 0 0 0 O1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0%
O2 0 3 1 0 4 O2 0.0% 2.0% 0.7% 0.0% 2.7%
O3 10 62 14 18 104 O3 6.7% 41.3% 9.3% 12.0% 69.3%
O4 6 14 2 16 38 O4 4.0% 9.3% 1.3% 10.7% 25.3%
O5 0 2 0 2 4 O5 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 2.7%
O6 0 0 0 0 0 O6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0%
16 81 17 36 10.7% 54.0% 11.3% 24.0% 100%
Total Marine Officers
Utility from NPS Model
GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV
0% 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 37 5 11 3 9 2 13
1.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
3.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0
5.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 0
7.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
9.5% 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 14 3 3 2 2 0 2
11.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total Respondents 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 10 60 12 18 6 14 2 16



















O1 O2 O3 O4
Marine Composition from NPS Survey % Makeup of FMF OFFICERs  (O1-O6)
O2O1
Bonus







GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
0.00% 0.49% 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Total Utility
1.000 1.075 1.000 1.048 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 19.90 Surplus
7717 7717 7717 7717 9316 9316 9316 9316 $100,000 <= $100,000 (0)
0 >= 0 0
3333 >= 2000 1333
75667 >= 52000 23667
19000 >= 19000 0
7717 7717 7717 7717 2000 >= 2000 0
9316 9316 9316 9316 0 >= 0 0
7717 9316 8000 >= 8000 0
7717 9316 62167 >= 40500 21667
7717 9316 11833 >= 8500 3333
7717 9316 18000 >= 18000 0 Slack
0 >= 0 0 <= 0 (0)
0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
0 = 0 0 = 0
0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
2500 >= 1500 1000 <= 2500 0
833 >= 500 333 <= 833 0
0 >= 0 0 <= 0 (0)
5000 >= 5000 0 <= 8333 3333
51667 >= 31000 20667 <= 51667 0
10000 >= 7000 3000 <= 11667 1667
9000 >= 9000 0 <= 15000 6000
3000 >= 3000 0 <= 5000 2000
7000 >= 7000 0 <= 11667 4667
1000 >= 1000 (0) <= 1667 667
8000 >= 8000 0 <= 13333 5333
7717 0 >= 0 0 <= 0 (0)
7717 1000 >= 1000 0 <= 1667 667
7717 0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
7717 1000 >= 1000 0 <= 1667 667
9316 0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
9316 0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0
9316 0 >= 0 0 <= 0 0













GCA GS AVS AV GCA GS AVS AV Input Cells
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Resultant Cells
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Surplus / Defecit
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Constraint Cells
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 GCA Ground Combat Arms
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 GS Ground Support
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AVS Aviation Support
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AV Aviation  
0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
0.00% 7.50% 0.00% 4.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
105%
3.2 $18,000 18.0% 24.0% 75%
2.4 $11,833 11.8% 11.3%
75%
12.2 $62,167 62.2% 54.0% 115%
1.5 $8,000 8.0% 10.7%
4.87%
Total Effect
% of Budget Spent
100.0%
Bonus Breakdown by MOS






Bonus Breakdown by Rank
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